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From: andrea@cpushare.com
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>,
	Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	andrea <andrea@cpushare.com>
Subject: Re: [patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n
Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2006 00:48:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060712224814.GD24367@opteron.random> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0607121453230.5623@g5.osdl.org>

> On Wed, 12 Jul 2006, Chuck Ebbert wrote:
> >
> > We can just fold the TSC disable stuff into the new thread_flags test
> > at context-switch time:

Great idea Chunk! We already use them in the syscall, it sounds a
perfect fit ;).

On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 02:55:38PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> 
> I really think that this should be cleaned up to _not_ confuse the issue 
> of TSC with any "secure computing" issue.
> 
> The two have nothing to do with each other from a technical standpoint. 
> 
> Just make the flag be called "TIF_NOTSC", and then any random usage 
> (whether it be seccomp or anything else) can just set that flag, the same 
> way ioperm() sets TIF_IO_BITMAP.
> 
> Much cleaner. 
> 
> There's no point in mixing up an implementation detail like SECCOMP with a 
> feature like this.

The only single advantage I can see in remaining purely in function of
seccomp instead of going in function of _TIF_NOTSC, is that the below
block would be completely optimized away at compile time when
CONFIG_SECCOMP is set to N. This now become a slow-path, but then I'm
unsure if the anti-seccomp advocates can live with this block in the
slow path given that seccomp will be the only user of the feature. I
suspect they won't like it but then I could be wrong.

I like it either ways.

	/*
	 * Context switch may need to tweak the TSC disable bit in CR4.
	 * The optimizer should remove this code when !CONFIG_SECCOMP.
	 */
	if (has_secure_computing(task_thread_info(prev_p)) ^
	    has_secure_computing(task_thread_info(next_p))) {
		/* prev and next are different */
		if (has_secure_computing(task_thread_info(next_p)))
			write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_TSD);
		else
			write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_TSD);
	}

  reply	other threads:[~2006-07-12 22:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-07-12 21:37 [patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n Chuck Ebbert
2006-07-12 21:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-12 22:48   ` andrea [this message]
2006-07-12 21:57 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 22:14   ` [patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n II Andi Kleen
     [not found] <6tgj0-8ip-19@gated-at.bofh.it>
     [not found] ` <6xP8s-5mc-9@gated-at.bofh.it>
     [not found]   ` <6xUhQ-4Wx-33@gated-at.bofh.it>
     [not found]     ` <6xVdX-6oH-53@gated-at.bofh.it>
     [not found]       ` <6xVnz-6AI-21@gated-at.bofh.it>
     [not found]         ` <6xZUd-4Es-13@gated-at.bofh.it>
     [not found]           ` <6y7yy-7ws-13@gated-at.bofh.it>
     [not found]             ` <6y7RK-7TX-9@gated-at.bofh.it>
2006-07-17 11:37               ` [patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n Bodo Eggert
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-07-13  5:43 Albert Cahalan
2006-07-13  7:07 ` andrea
2006-06-29 19:21 [2.6 patch] " Adrian Bunk
2006-06-30  0:44 ` Lee Revell
2006-06-30  1:07   ` Andrew Morton
2006-06-30  1:40     ` Adrian Bunk
2006-06-30  4:52       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-06-30  9:47         ` Ingo Molnar
2006-06-30 14:58           ` andrea
2006-07-11  7:36             ` [patch] " Ingo Molnar
2006-07-11 14:17               ` andrea
2006-07-11 14:32                 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 15:31                   ` andrea
2006-07-11 15:54                     ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 16:13                       ` andrea
2006-07-11 16:23                         ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 16:57                         ` Alan Cox
2006-07-11 16:25                       ` Alan Cox
2006-07-11 16:02                     ` Adrian Bunk
2006-07-11 16:16                       ` andrea
2006-07-11 16:24                     ` Alan Cox
2006-07-12 15:43                       ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 21:07                         ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:06                           ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 22:19                             ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:33                               ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 22:49                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13  3:16                               ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13 11:23                                 ` Jeff Dike
2006-07-13 11:35                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13  3:04                             ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13  3:12                               ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13  4:40                                 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13  4:51                                   ` andrea
2006-07-13  5:12                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13  6:22                                     ` andrea
2006-07-13  1:51                           ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-13  2:00                             ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13  7:44                             ` James Bruce
2006-07-13  8:34                               ` andrea
2006-07-13  9:18                                 ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-13 12:13                             ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 21:22                         ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:11                           ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-11 15:54                 ` Pavel Machek

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