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From: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
To: "George S. Coker, II" <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
	xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, xense-devel@lists.xensource.com,
	Jun Koi <junkoi2004@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Xense-devel][RFC][PATCH][0/4] Xen Security Modules: Intro
Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2006 11:57:38 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060901185738.GD21066@sequoia.sous-sol.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1157135088.22006.218.camel@moss-walleye.epoch.ncsc.mil>

* George S. Coker, II (gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil) wrote:
> On Fri, 2006-09-01 at 10:58 -0700, Chris Wright wrote:
> > * Jun Koi (junkoi2004@gmail.com) wrote:
> > > - LSM has a problem of not supporting stacking module, and that is
> > > really paint in the arse. How about XSM? Do you try to fix that
> > > problem?
> > 
> > I don't see anything in XSM that changes that limitation to LSM.  In fact,
> > it appears to not even support the very weak stacking via chaining
> > mechanism (which is a good plan in this case).  And it's questionable
> > at best.  Arbitrary security policies simply do not compose.
> 
> We have made a conscious decision not to bring LSM's stacking
> capabilities to Xen.

Yes, I think that's a wise decision (that's what I meant by good plan).

> Composition of security policies is difficult at
> best, and a given security modules behavior cannot be easily predicted
> under arbitrary stacking.  Arbitrary stacking risks eroding the security
> goals of an individual module while meeting few or none of the security
> goals of the user.  Stacking should be implemented within a security
> module that has been designed to stack specific modules to achieve a
> specific goal.

Indeed.  Sorry if my wording above was misleading, I'm in complete
agreement.

thanks,
-chris


> 
> George
> > thanks,
> > -chris
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
> http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

      reply	other threads:[~2006-09-01 18:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-09-01 16:57 [Xense-devel][RFC][PATCH][0/4] Xen Security Modules: Intro George S. Coker, II
2006-09-01 17:36 ` Jun Koi
2006-09-01 17:42   ` Jun Koi
2006-09-01 17:58   ` Chris Wright
2006-09-01 18:20     ` Robert Watson
2006-09-01 19:09       ` Chris Wright
2006-09-01 19:40       ` James Morris
2006-09-01 18:24     ` George S. Coker, II
2006-09-01 18:57       ` Chris Wright [this message]

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