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From: Chase Venters <chase.venters@clientec.com>
To: goodfellas@shellcode.com.ar
Cc: Linux kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@mac.com>,
	endrazine <endrazine@gmail.com>,
	Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>,
	Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Registration Weakness in Linux Kernel's Binary formats
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2006 22:49:10 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <200610032249.33712.chase.venters@clientec.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1159902785.2855.34.camel@goku.staff.locallan>

On Tuesday 03 October 2006 14:12, SHELLCODE Security Research wrote:
> Hello,
> The present document aims to demonstrate a design weakness found in the
> handling of simply
> linked   lists   used   to   register   binary   formats   handled   by
> Linux   kernel,   and   affects   all   the   kernel families
> (2.0/2.2/2.4/2.6), allowing the insertion of infection modules in
> kernel­ space that can be used by malicious users to create infection
> tools, for example rootkits.

Yay, you've been Slashdotted!

Question: Why did you personally submit this to Slashdot when it is absolutely 
clear that the observation is akin to figuring out a process can call fork() 
and exec() and become "/bin/rm" with an argv of "/bin/rm", "-rf", and "*"?

Is this what you call good marketing?

> POC, details and proposed solution at:
> English version: http://www.shellcode.com.ar/docz/binfmt-en.pdf
> Spanish version: http://www.shellcode.com.ar/docz/binfmt-es.pdf
>

Thanks,
Chase

  parent reply	other threads:[~2006-10-04  3:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-10-03 19:13 Registration Weakness in Linux Kernel's Binary formats SHELLCODE Security Research
2006-10-03 21:48 ` Chase Venters
2006-10-03 22:54   ` Alan Cox
2006-10-04  3:49 ` Chase Venters [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-10-03 21:25 Fwd: " Bráulio Oliveira
2006-10-03 21:53 ` Kyle Moffett
2006-10-03 21:59   ` Stephen Hemminger
2006-10-03 22:28     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-10-04  4:08 Julio Auto
2006-10-04  4:25 ` Chase Venters
2006-10-04 14:55   ` Alan Cox
2006-10-04 14:34     ` Xavier Bestel
2006-10-04  5:40 ` Kyle Moffett
2006-10-04  7:11   ` Peter Read

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