Re: [redhat-lspp] Re: RHEL5 Kernel with labeled networking

[Klaus Weidner <klaus@atsec.com>]

On Tue, Oct 03, 2006 at 04:38:48PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> --- Linda Knippers <linda.knippers@hp.com> wrote:
> > It has a requirement to be able to audit all modifications of the
> > values of security attributes, so we can audit a bunch of syscalls
> > that do that (chmod, chown, setxattr, ...).  Relabeling files would
> > definitely count and be covered.  There's also a requirement about
> > auditing changes to the way data is imported/exported, so this is
> > where the networking stuff comes in.  I don't know about domain
> > transitions.
> 
> I think you would have trouble arguing that a domain transition is not
> a change in the security state of the system. For the evaluations I
> worked auditing was required for any change to uids, gids,
> capabilities, sensitivity, integrity, or any other security relevent
> attribute.

Yes, it is a change in the process security state.

Domain transitions are auditable already - dynamic transitions through
the auditallow rules on /proc/$PID/attr/*, and automatic transitions by
putting filesystem watches on the *_exec_t binaries you're interested in.

-Klaus

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