From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753169AbXCXQQS (ORCPT ); Sat, 24 Mar 2007 12:16:18 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1753191AbXCXQQS (ORCPT ); Sat, 24 Mar 2007 12:16:18 -0400 Received: from e2.ny.us.ibm.com ([32.97.182.142]:38118 "EHLO e2.ny.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753169AbXCXQQR (ORCPT ); Sat, 24 Mar 2007 12:16:17 -0400 Date: Sat, 24 Mar 2007 21:53:26 +0530 From: Srivatsa Vaddagiri To: menage@google.com Cc: sekharan@us.ibm.com, ckrm-tech@lists.sourceforge.net, xemul@sw.ru, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rohitseth@google.com, pj@sgi.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, winget@google.com, containers@lists.osdl.org Subject: Re: [ckrm-tech] [PATCH 7/7] containers (V7): Container interface to nsproxy subsystem Message-ID: <20070324162326.GC11794@in.ibm.com> Reply-To: vatsa@in.ibm.com References: <20070212081521.808338000@menage.corp.google.com> <20070212085105.170265000@menage.corp.google.com> <20070324050537.GA27040@in.ibm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20070324050537.GA27040@in.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sat, Mar 24, 2007 at 10:35:37AM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > > +static int ns_create(struct container_subsys *ss, struct container *cont) > > +{ > > + struct nscont *ns; > > + > > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > > + return -EPERM; > > Does this check break existing namespace semantics in a subtle way? > It now requires that unshare() of namespaces by any task requires > CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities. I should clarify that I am referring to unshare thr' clone here (and not thr' sys_unshare) > clone(.., CLONE_NEWUTS, ..)->copy_namespaces()->ns_container_clone()-> > ->container_clone()-> .. -> container_create() -> ns_create() > > Earlier, one could unshare his uts namespace w/o CAP_SYS_ADMIN > capabilities. Now it is required. Is that fine? Don't know. > > I feel we can avoid this check totally and let the directory permissions > take care of these checks. > > Serge, what do you think? -- Regards, vatsa