From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
To: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: John Wan <J.Wan@mbs.edu>, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: Would the SELinux act as a TippingPoint IPS to block the nasty Trojan traffic?
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2007 09:16:29 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <200704110916.30573.paul.moore@hp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <461C4EC5.7080907@manicmethod.com>
On Tuesday, April 10 2007 10:58:13 pm Joshua Brindle wrote:
> >> I'd love to see your suggestions on solving the forwarding problem, I
> >> suppose those are forthcoming? :)
> >
> > Right now you'll have to make do with the discussion from the developer's
> > summit and my lovely emails ;) The patches will be forthcoming but I
> > need to wrap up some loose ends on another project right now ..
>
> for some reason I don't remember a design being discussed at the summit,
> I'm probably just forgetting. This is not secpoint based right?
It was discussed but towards the end of the day in the networking discussion
block. See the notes that Stephen posted a while ago.
The idea is to create a new iptables "target" (probably the wrong term, but
I'm not an iptables expert ... yet) which had an assigned label, you would
then create iptables rules which would match certain traffic to
that "target". The packets which hit the "target" would have an access check
similar to the following:
allow <target_label> <external_packet_label> : class perm;
So it's very similar to the secpoint (or whatever it was being called) idea.
Also, just to re-iterate this - I HAVE NO PLANS TO MERGE THE INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL LABELS. The original intent is to only provide support for
external, i.e. NetLabel and labeled IPsec, labeling mechanisms; if we decide
to provide support for internal labeling mechanisms like SECMARK we will do
so in parallel with additional access checks.
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-04-11 13:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-04-10 11:30 Would the SELinux act as a TippingPoint IPS to block the nasty Trojan traffic? John Wan
2007-04-10 15:18 ` Paul Moore
2007-04-11 0:11 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-04-11 2:46 ` Paul Moore
2007-04-11 2:58 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-04-11 13:16 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2007-04-11 15:10 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2007-04-11 15:17 ` Paul Moore
2007-04-12 17:39 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2007-04-11 17:01 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-04-11 17:32 ` Paul Moore
2007-04-12 17:51 ` Venkat Yekkirala
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2007-04-12 17:52 Venkat Yekkirala
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