Re: Why does reading from /dev/urandom deplete entropy so much?

[Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>]

On Sat, Dec 08, 2007 at 06:46:12PM -0500, Theodore Tso wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 09, 2007 at 12:10:10AM +0200, Ismail Dönmez wrote:
> > > As long as /dev/random is readable for all users there's no reason to
> > > use /dev/urandom for a local DoS...
> > 
> > Draining entropy in /dev/urandom means that insecure and possibly not random 
> > data will be used and well thats a security bug if not a DoS bug.
> 
> Actually in modern 2.6 kernels there are two separate output entropy
> pools for /dev/random and /dev/urandom.  So assuming that the
> adversary doesn't know the contents of the current state of the
> entropy pool (i.e., the RNG is well seeded with entropy), you can read
> all you want from /dev/urandom and that won't give an adversary
> successful information to attack /dev/random.

Wouldn't it be possible to mix the data with the pid+uid of the reading
process so that even if another one tries to collect data from urandom,
he cannot predict what another process will get ? BTW, I think that the
tuple (pid,uid,timestamp of open) is unpredictable and uncontrollable
enough to provide one or even a few bits of entropy by itself.

Regards,
Willy