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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, shaggy@us.ibm.com,
	sandeen@redhat.com, jmoyer@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] eCryptfs: Fix dentry handling on create error, unlink, and inode destroy
Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2008 14:42:15 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080108144215.f21115e2.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080108215807.GE10989@localhost.austin.ibm.com>

On Tue, 8 Jan 2008 15:58:07 -0600
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> wrote:

> > >  	rc = ecryptfs_interpose(lower_dentry, ecryptfs_dentry,
> > >  				directory_inode->i_sb, 0);
> > 
> > Will this cause an undesirable log storm if the underlying fs runs
> > out of space?
> 
> When you're bumping up against the end of your storage space, you will
> get a lot more that just this message in your logs. There are printk's
> in ecryptfs_write_lower(), ecryptfs_encrypt_page(), ecryptfs_write(),
> and ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents() that will get pretty
> noisy. Is it worth wrapping those in a higher level of verbosity?

The consequences of this can actually be pretty harmful.  syslogd typically
does sychronous writes so a random full disk can cause a seek storm over on
the log disk and a runaway ecryptfs-using application could pretty quickly
exhaust the space on the log disk.

So I'd suggest that sometime you go through the fs and find any such
user-triggerable printks and fix them up.  The most robust way of fixing
them up would be to delete them, or make them dependent on
CONFIG_ECRYPTFS_DEBUG.  Fiddling with the facility levels would help, but
it just lessens the probability rather than fixing it completely.


      reply	other threads:[~2008-01-08 22:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-01-08  5:25 [PATCH] eCryptfs: Fix dentry handling on create error, unlink, and inode destroy Michael Halcrow
2008-01-08  5:45 ` Andrew Morton
2008-01-08 21:58   ` Michael Halcrow
2008-01-08 22:42     ` Andrew Morton [this message]

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