Re: design of user namespaces

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serue-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>]

Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org):
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> writes:
> 
> > There are.  But one key point is that the namespace ids are not
> > cryptographic keys.  They don't need to be globally unique, or even 100%
> > unique on one system (though that gets too subtle).
> >
> > I was wanting to keep them tiny - or at least variably sized - so they
> > could be stored with each inode.
> 
> Sure.  I think they make a lot of sense.  idmapd uses domain names
> for this purpose.  At the moment I just don't think the are necessary.
> Like veth isn't necessary for network namespaces.  Ultimately we
> will use these identifiers all of the time but it doesn't mean
> the generic code has to deal with them.
> 
> 
> >> In particular:  Is this user allowed to use this ID?
> >
> > One way to address that is actually by having a system-wide tool with
> > CAP_SET_USERNS=fp which enforces a userid-to-unsid mapping.  The host
> > sysadmin creates a table, say, 500:0 may use unsid 10-15.  500:0 (let's
> > call him hallyn) doesn't have CAP_SET_USERNS permissions himself, but
> > can run /bin/set_unsid, which runs with CAP_SET_USERNS and ensures that
> > hallyn uses only unsids 10-15.
> >
> > It's not ideal.  I'd rather have some sort of fancy collision-proof
> > global persistant id system, but again I think it's important that if
> > 500:0 creates userns 1 and 400:1 creates userns 2, and 0:2 creates a
> > file, that the file be persistantly marked as belonging to
> > (500:0,400:1,0:2), distinct from another file created by
> > (500:0,400:1,1000:2).  Which means these things have to be stored
> > per-inode, meaning they can't be too large.
> 
> So my suggestion was something like this:
> mount -o nativemount,uidns=1 /
> 
> Then the filesystem performs magic to ask if the owner of user namespace
> is allowed to use uidns 1.  That magic would consult a config file like:
> 
> [domains]
>   local1.mydomain  1
>   local2.mydomain  2
>   local3.mydomain  3
> 
> [users]
>   bob   local1.mydomain
>   bob   local3.mydomain
>   nancy local2.mydomain
> 
> Or something like that.  Reporting which users are allowed to use
> which userid namespaces, and the mapping of those userid namespaces
> to something compact for storing in the filesystem.
> 
> The magic could be an upcall to userspace.
> The magic could be loading the configuration file at mount time.
> The magic could be storing the config file in the filesystem
> and having special commands to access it like quotas.
> 
> The very important points are that it is a remount of an existing mount
> so that we don't have to worry about corrupted filesystem attacks, and
> that authentication is performed at mount time.

Conceptually that (making corrupted fs attacks a non-issue) is
wonderful.  Practically, I may be missing something:  When you say
remount, it seems you must either mean a bind mount or a remount.  If
remount, then that will want to change superblock flags.  If the
child userns(+child mntns) does a real remount, then that will change
the flags for the parent ns as well, right?

If instead we do a bind mount we don't have that problem, but then the
fs can't be the one doing the user namespace work.

I'm probably missing something...

> I just think that once we get to the point of specifying the parameters at
> mount time.  There is no need for generic kernel configuration of a
> uidns name.

thanks,
-serge