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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	pageexec@freemail.hu, Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@tglx.de, hpa@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [patch] Add basic sanity checks to the syscall execution patch
Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2008 14:53:31 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080907125331.GA1707@elf.ucw.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080906154551.GB1774@elte.hu>

On Sat 2008-09-06 17:45:51, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> 
> > Then they will simply proceed like this :
> >   - patch /boot/vmlinuz
> >   - sync
> >   - crash system
> > 
> > => user says "oh crap" and presses the reset button. Patched kernel boots.
> >    Game over. Patching vmlinuz for known targetted distros is even easier
> >    because the attacker just has to embed binary changes for the most
> >    common distro kernels.
> 
> a reboot often raises attention. But yes, in terms of end user boxes, 
> probably not. Anyway, my points were about transparent rootkits 
> installed on a running system without anyone noticing - obviously if the 
> attacker can modify the kernel image and the user does not mind a reboot 
> it's game over.

Well, install a rootkit in /boot/vmlinuz, sync, then wait for user to
reboot its system?

Even well-kept servers are rebooted from time to time.

I agree -- the only way to win is not to play this game.

-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

  parent reply	other threads:[~2008-09-07 12:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-09-04  2:51 [patch] Add basic sanity checks to the syscall execution patch Arjan van de Ven
2008-09-04 12:01 ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-04 12:34   ` Alan Cox
2008-09-04 13:06     ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-04 12:44   ` Arjan van de Ven
2008-09-05  9:43     ` pageexec
2008-09-05 10:14       ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2008-09-05 10:49         ` pageexec
2008-09-05 10:57           ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2008-09-05 11:42             ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-05 12:00               ` pageexec
2008-09-05 15:42                 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-05 16:23                   ` pageexec
2008-09-05 16:52                     ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-05 17:26                       ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-05 19:42                         ` pageexec
2008-09-05 20:48                           ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-05 19:37                       ` pageexec
2008-09-06 15:42                         ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-07  0:17                           ` pageexec
2008-09-05 12:01               ` Andi Kleen
2008-09-05 20:41               ` Willy Tarreau
2008-09-06 15:45                 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-09-06 16:34                   ` Jeroen van Rijn
2008-09-07 12:53                   ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2008-09-05 16:05       ` Arjan van de Ven

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