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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, hch@infradead.org,
	viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: unprivileged mounts git tree
Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2008 20:56:46 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080914015646.GC18604@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <m1tzck68od.fsf@frodo.ebiederm.org>

Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> writes:
> 
> 
> > Ok, but this is all done as root.  Kind of a silly thing for root to
> > do :)
> 
> There are less silly examples like setting up a chroot type
> environment contained in a mount namespace and having a kernel oops
> and then not being able to delete all of your files.

I wasn't saying that I believe I can win an argument by knocking down
one example :)

In fact I'm not trying to win an argument.  Because I'm quite sure you
and Miklos are right, and I just need to figure out what I'm missing.

> > So in order for me as an unprivileged user to pin a dentry by mounting
> > over it, I have to have write permission to the dentry to begin with
> > as well as the dentry being under a user=hallyn mount.
> 
> That second condition is interesting requiring write permission of the
> dentry.  I thought we had obviated the need for that when we added
> ownership to the mounts themselves.  In this case at least it shouldn't
> it be write permission on the directory containing the dentry.

Oh no, it seems I'm wrong, that's not a condition.  Just tested it.

> >> Now you can't create /etc/passwd.new and rename it to /etc/passwd.
> >> Stopping adduser from working.
> >> 
> >> As Miklos said this can apply to any file or any directory, so it can
> >> be a DOS against any other user on the system.
> >
> > Except I need to own the mount as well as the dentry.  So after
> > root does
> >
> > 	mmount --bind -o user=hallyn /home/hallyn /home/hallyn
> > 	mmount --bind -o user=hallyn /home/serge /home/serge
> >
> > if user serge (uid 501) tries to
> >
> > 	mmount --bind /etc /home/hallyn/etc
> > 	mmount --bind /etc /home/serge/etc
> >
> > permission for the first will be denied because serge does not
> > have write perms to /home/hallyn/etc, and permission for the second
> > will be denied because only hallyn may mount under /home/serge.
> >
> > If root properly did
> >
> > 	mmount --bind -o user=hallyn /home/hallyn /home/hallyn
> > 	mmount --bind -o user=serge /home/serge /home/serge
> >
> > and then hallyn does
> >
> > 	mmount --bind /etc /home/hallyn/etc
> >
> > and serge does
> >
> > 	mmount --bind /home/hallyn/etc /home/serge/etc
> >
> > then hallyn can still ummount /home/hallyn/etc.
> >
> > And we've decided that users cannot (for now) do shared mounts.
> > So I'm still not sure where there is the potential for danger?
> 
> Ok.  Let's pick on something a little more interesting.
> 
> root does:
> 	mmount --bind -o user=hallyn /home/hallyn /home/hallyn
> hallyn does:
> 	mount --bind /tmp /home/hallyn/tmp
>         touch dummy
> 	mount --bind dummy /home/hallyn/tmp/some_shared_file_I_have_write_access_to.
> 
> Which allows me to transform write permissions into the ability to
> deny someone else the ability to delete a file.

Yup, that's an interesting example.

Still an admin *can* work around that, if he can sufficiently parse
/proc/self/mountinfo to know to umount
/home/hallyn/tmp/some_shared_file_I_have_write_access_to.

Is that sufficient?  Probably not?

> This seems to mess up things like revoke.

Hey, do we have revoke now?  :)

> At a practical level it is a real annoyance, regardless of the security
> implications.
> 
> As a point of comparison plan9 does not have that restriction.

Why doesn't it have that restriction?  Does it always allow you to rm a
mounted-over file?

-serge

  reply	other threads:[~2008-09-14  1:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-05-07 12:05 unprivileged mounts git tree Miklos Szeredi
2008-08-07 22:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-08-08  0:07   ` Eric W. Biederman
2008-08-08  0:25     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-08-25 11:01       ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-08-27 15:36         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-08-27 15:55           ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-08-27 18:46             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-03 18:45               ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-03 21:54                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-03 22:02                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-03 22:25                   ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-03 22:43                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-04  6:42                       ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-04 13:28                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-04 14:06                           ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-04 15:40                             ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-04 16:17                               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-04 17:42                                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-04 17:48                                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-04 18:03                                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-04 18:49                                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-04 22:26                                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-04 23:32                                           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-05 15:31                               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-09 13:34                                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-11 10:37                                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2008-09-11 14:43                                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-11 15:20                                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-11 15:44                                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-11 18:54                                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2008-09-12 22:08                                           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-13  3:12                                             ` Eric W. Biederman
2008-09-14  1:56                                               ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2008-09-14  3:06                                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2008-09-30 19:39                                                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-10-06 11:05                                                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-09-11 19:04                                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2008-09-11 19:58                                         ` Eric W. Biederman

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