From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mailman by lists.gnu.org with archive (Exim 4.43) id 1LasGp-00009c-A9 for mharc-grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 08:51:55 -0500 Received: from mailman by lists.gnu.org with tmda-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1LasGl-00009X-St for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 08:51:51 -0500 Received: from exim by lists.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1LasGh-00009L-EN for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 08:51:48 -0500 Received: from [199.232.76.173] (port=36449 helo=monty-python.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1LasGg-00009I-DI for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 08:51:46 -0500 Received: from aybabtu.com ([69.60.117.155]:53207) by monty-python.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS-1.0:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1LasGf-00083b-U3 for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 08:51:46 -0500 Received: from [192.168.10.10] (helo=thorin) by aybabtu.com with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1LasA9-00075T-7H; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 14:45:01 +0100 Received: from rmh by thorin with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1LasGc-0004H2-F9; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 14:51:42 +0100 Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 14:51:42 +0100 From: Robert Millan To: The development of GRUB 2 Message-ID: <20090221135142.GK16068@thorin> References: <499DF97E.1080800@student.ethz.ch> <200902200945.51426.michael@gorven.za.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <200902200945.51426.michael@gorven.za.net> Organization: free as in freedom X-Message-Flag: Worried about Outlook viruses? Switch to Thunderbird! www.mozilla.com/thunderbird X-Debbugs-No-Ack: true User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.18 (2008-05-17) X-detected-operating-system: by monty-python.gnu.org: Genre and OS details not recognized. Cc: Alex Besogonov Subject: Re: A _good_ and valid use for TPM X-BeenThere: grub-devel@gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list Reply-To: The development of GRUB 2 List-Id: The development of GRUB 2 List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 13:51:52 -0000 On Fri, Feb 20, 2009 at 09:45:28AM +0200, Michael Gorven wrote: > > TPM can be used for good or for bad, but this is the case for everything > involving cryptography. We don't refuse to use encryption algorithms because > they could be used for DRM, so why should we refuse to use TPM? I don't agree with this analogy. Unlike cryptography, TPMs have been designed from the ground up to serve an evil purpose. They *could* have designed them with good intent, for example either of these could apply: - Buyer gets a printed copy of the TPM's private key when they buy a board. - An override button that's physically accessible from the chip can be used to disable "hostile mode" and make the TPM sign everything. From that point physical access can be managed with traditional methods (e.g. locks). But they didn't. -- Robert Millan The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all."