From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mailman by lists.gnu.org with archive (Exim 4.43) id 1Layh5-0002DA-Jl for mharc-grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 15:43:27 -0500 Received: from mailman by lists.gnu.org with tmda-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1Layh4-0002D5-1v for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 15:43:26 -0500 Received: from exim by lists.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1Layh1-0002Ct-KY for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 15:43:24 -0500 Received: from [199.232.76.173] (port=39519 helo=monty-python.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Layh1-0002Cq-Fb for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 15:43:23 -0500 Received: from aybabtu.com ([69.60.117.155]:58450) by monty-python.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS-1.0:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1Layh1-00022Q-1a for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 15:43:23 -0500 Received: from [192.168.10.10] (helo=thorin) by aybabtu.com with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1LayaT-0000ET-EA for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 21:36:37 +0100 Received: from rmh by thorin with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1Laygy-0004um-Da for grub-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 21 Feb 2009 21:43:20 +0100 Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 21:43:20 +0100 From: Robert Millan To: The development of GRUB 2 Message-ID: <20090221204320.GH18492@thorin> References: <499DF97E.1080800@student.ethz.ch> <200902200945.51426.michael@gorven.za.net> <20090221135142.GK16068@thorin> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Organization: free as in freedom X-Message-Flag: Worried about Outlook viruses? Switch to Thunderbird! www.mozilla.com/thunderbird X-Debbugs-No-Ack: true User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.18 (2008-05-17) X-detected-operating-system: by monty-python.gnu.org: Genre and OS details not recognized. Subject: Re: A _good_ and valid use for TPM X-BeenThere: grub-devel@gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list Reply-To: The development of GRUB 2 List-Id: The development of GRUB 2 List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2009 20:43:26 -0000 On Sat, Feb 21, 2009 at 06:58:58PM +0200, Alex Besogonov wrote: > On Sat, Feb 21, 2009 at 3:51 PM, Robert Millan wrote: > > - An override button that's physically accessible from the chip can be > > used to disable "hostile mode" and make the TPM sign everything. From > > that point physical access can be managed with traditional methods (e.g. > > locks). > > But they didn't. > And actually, they did. > ================================ > New flexibility in EKs. In the 1.1b specification, endorsement keys > were fixed in the > chip at manufacture. This allowed a certificate to be provided by the > manufacturer for the > key. However, some privacy advocates are worried about the EK becoming > a nonchangeable > identifier (in spite of all the privacy controls around it, which > would make doing > this very difficult). ***As a result, the specification allows a > manufacturer to allow the key to > be removed by the end user and regenerated.*** Of course the > certificate at that point would > become worthless, and it could be very expensive for the end user to > get a new certificate. > ================================ > https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/TSS/TSS_1_2_Errata_A-final.pdf I would have to study this in detail, but I don't see the text saying that remote attestation is no longer supported. What this probably amounts to is that the coercion process can now be made anonymously, which I already knew: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_anonymous_attestation and which is not the core of the problem. -- Robert Millan The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all."