Re: correct locking in softirq

["Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>]

On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 09:29:06AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, 2009-02-27 at 08:54 +0100, Giacomo wrote:
> > Good morning
> > 
> > Harald Welte's "The journey of a packet through the Linux 2.6.10
> > network stack" article says that packet travelling inside
> > linux kernel 2.6 (the receive / input part) runs in softirq context.
> > 
> > Hooking with netfilter's hooks in a kernel module, i need to read for
> > each packet received a list of rules.
> > 
> > Since in input and prerouting hooks the context is softirq (perhaps
> > also in forward?), I need some read lock
> > feature.
> > 
> > I currently use RCU lists and, while reading lists I use
> > 
> > READ
> > 
> > read_lock_bh()
> > 
> > together with list_for_each_rcu()
> > 
> > When changing, or flushing, rules, I use
> > 
> > WRITE
> > 
> > spin_lock() + list_add_tail_rcu() (adding)
> > 
> > or spin_lock() + list_for_each_entry() (for listing and then freeing
> > with list_del_rcu() and call_rcu() )
> > 
> > The question is:
> > 
> > - is the read part above correct? - do I really need _bh()? or should
> > I use simply read_lock() ?
> > 
> > Thanks in advance
> 
> rcu_read_lock() + call_rcu() are correct, even from softirq context, and
> mandatory if anything is exposed to anything other than softirq context.
> 
> rcu_read_lock_bh() + call_rcu_bh() is usable IFF the data is only ever
> used from softirq.

If "softirq" also includes sections of local_bh_disable()ed code in
process context, also including irq-disabled code, agreed!

> The distinction between the two RCU variants is that the _bh variant can
> have a slightly faster quiescent cycle.

Especially when under heavy interrupt/softirq load.  If a given
CPU is totally consumed handling interrupts and softirqs in a
non-CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT kernel, then the call_rcu() variant might never
invoke its callback, while the call_rcu_bh() variant would still be
able to do so in a timely fashion.  The _bh() variant was inspired by
simulate DoS attacks, work by Robert Olsson and Dipankar Sarma.

							Thanx, Paul