From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mailman by lists.gnu.org with archive (Exim 4.43) id 1Ld95l-00047h-Pv for mharc-grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 27 Feb 2009 15:13:53 -0500 Received: from mailman by lists.gnu.org with tmda-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1Ld95f-00040E-IB for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 27 Feb 2009 15:13:47 -0500 Received: from exim by lists.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1Ld95d-0003y7-Or for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 27 Feb 2009 15:13:47 -0500 Received: from [199.232.76.173] (port=53925 helo=monty-python.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Ld95d-0003xy-8k for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 27 Feb 2009 15:13:45 -0500 Received: from aybabtu.com ([69.60.117.155]:35042) by monty-python.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS-1.0:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1Ld95c-0001Cn-Vz for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 27 Feb 2009 15:13:45 -0500 Received: from [192.168.10.10] (helo=thorin) by aybabtu.com with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1Ld8yV-0006Wu-Cw for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 27 Feb 2009 21:06:24 +0100 Received: from rmh by thorin with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1Ld95a-0008HR-7O for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 27 Feb 2009 21:13:42 +0100 Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2009 21:13:42 +0100 From: Robert Millan To: The development of GRUB 2 Message-ID: <20090227201342.GF31629@thorin> References: <499DB343.9020301@gmail.com> <499DF97E.1080800@student.ethz.ch> <20090221134607.GJ16068@thorin> <20090221202158.GD18492@thorin> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Organization: free as in freedom X-Message-Flag: Worried about Outlook viruses? Switch to Thunderbird! www.mozilla.com/thunderbird X-Debbugs-No-Ack: true User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.18 (2008-05-17) X-detected-operating-system: by monty-python.gnu.org: Genre and OS details not recognized. Subject: Re: A _good_ and valid use for TPM X-BeenThere: grub-devel@gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list Reply-To: The development of GRUB 2 List-Id: The development of GRUB 2 List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2009 20:13:50 -0000 On Sun, Feb 22, 2009 at 03:26:32AM +0200, Alex Besogonov wrote: > Robert Millan wrote: >>> It's exactly what I want to do (minus the 'coercing' part). I want to >>> ensure that devices run only my unmodified software (which I consider >>> secure) and only in this case provide decryption keys for sensitive >>> data. Of course, it done not for DRM purposes, but rather to protect >>> sensitive data from theft (real theft, not copyright infringement). >> There's no fundamental difference between hardening a device and using that >> as your root of trust and using someone else's hardened device and using >> that as your root of trust. > There's a difference. It's impossible to create the root-of-trust > without some hardware/firmware support. I assume you mean a root of trust that's not vulnerable to physical attack. Sure, you need firmware support, but you don't need to blindly trust someone else's firmware when you can use coreboot with GRUB as your firmware. >> The only differences are: >> - One more link in the trust chain (irrelevant). >> - Because it's _someone else's_ computer (the TPM), you're irrationally >> assuming that its security is flawless. > Security of TPM vendors is audited by a third party. For most practical > purposes it can be considered quite adequate. Adequate maybe, not flawless. And using your own concrete is still cheaper and more trustworthy than someone else's silicon :-) -- Robert Millan The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all."