From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-cifs-client@lists.samba.org
Subject: Re: consistent oops from request_key in 2.6.29
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2009 13:53:34 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090331135334.3ffb8b31@tleilax.poochiereds.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <14730.1238521445@redhat.com>
On Tue, 31 Mar 2009 18:44:05 +0100
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> How about the attached patch?
>
> David
> ---
> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Handle there being no fallback destination keyring for request_key()
>
> When request_key() is called, without there being any standard process
> keyrings on which to fall back if a destination keyring is not specified, an
> oops is liable to occur when construct_alloc_key() calls down_write() on
> dest_keyring's semaphore.
>
> Due to function inlining this may be seen as an oops in down_write() as called
> from request_key_and_link().
>
> This situation crops up during boot, where request_key() is called from within
> the kernel (such as in CIFS mounts) where nobody is actually logged in, and so
> PAM has not had a chance to create a session keyring and user keyrings to act
> as the fallback.
>
> To fix this, make construct_alloc_key() not attempt to cache a key if there is
> no fallback key if no destination keyring is given specifically.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> security/keys/request_key.c | 9 ++++++---
> 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
>
> diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
> index 22a3158..03fe63e 100644
> --- a/security/keys/request_key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
> @@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
>
> set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
>
> - down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
> + if (dest_keyring)
> + down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
>
> /* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need
> * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
> @@ -322,10 +323,12 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
> if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
> goto key_already_present;
>
> - __key_link(dest_keyring, key);
> + if (dest_keyring)
> + __key_link(dest_keyring, key);
>
> mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
> - up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
> + if (dest_keyring)
> + up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
> mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
> *_key = key;
> kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
That'll fix it. I tested an identical patch this morning...
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-03-31 17:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-03-31 12:45 consistent oops from request_key in 2.6.29 Jeff Layton
2009-03-31 13:07 ` [linux-cifs-client] " Shirish Pargaonkar
2009-03-31 17:44 ` David Howells
2009-03-31 17:53 ` Jeff Layton [this message]
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