From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>,
Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>,
Kenneth Baker <bakerk@metacarta.com>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't)
Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2009 17:31:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090406153127.GA21220@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090401030339.GX28946@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On 04/01, Al Viro wrote:
>
> Rebased and pushed (same tree, same branch; included into for-next, along
> with related cleanups).
Sorry for delay!
Afaics, the usage of fs->in_exec is not completely right. But firstly, a
couple of minor nits.
check_unsafe_exec() doesn't need ->siglock, we can iterate over sub-threads
under rcu_read_lock(). Note that with RCU or ->siglock we can set the "wrong"
LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE if we race with copy_process(CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_FS), but
as it was already discussed we don't care. This means it is OK to miss the
freshly cloned thread which has already passed copy_fs().
do_execve:
/* execve succeeded */
write_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
write_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
afaics, fs->lock is not needed. If ->in_exec was set, it was set by this
thread-group and we do not share ->fs with another process. Since we are
the only thread now, we can clear ->in_exec lockless.
And now, what I think is wrong:
do_execve:
out_unmark:
write_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
write_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
Two threads T1 and T2 and another process P, all share the same ->fs.
T1 starts do_execve(BAD_FILE). It calls check_unsafe_exec(), since ->fs is
shared, we set LSM_UNSAFE but not ->in_exec (actually, not very good name).
P exits and decrements fs->users.
T2 starts do_execve(), calls check_unsafe_exec(), now ->fs is not shared,
we set fs->in_exec.
T1 continues, open_exec(BAD_FILE) fails, we clear ->in_exec and return
to the user-space.
T1 does clone(CLONE_FS /* without CLONE_THREAD */).
T1 continues without LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE while ->fs is shared with another
process.
What do you think about the (uncompiled) patch below ? It doesn't change
compat_do_execve(), just for discussion.
But see also another message I am going to send...
Oleg.
do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread,
and we don't need fs->lock to clear.
Also, s/lock_task_sighand/rcu_read_lock/ in check_unsafe_exec().
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1060,7 +1060,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct task_struct *p = current, *t;
- unsigned long flags;
unsigned n_fs;
int res = 0;
@@ -1068,11 +1067,12 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binpr
n_fs = 1;
write_lock(&p->fs->lock);
- lock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
+ rcu_read_lock();
for (t = next_thread(p); t != p; t = next_thread(t)) {
if (t->fs == p->fs)
n_fs++;
}
+ rcu_read_unlock();
if (p->fs->users > n_fs) {
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
@@ -1080,9 +1080,8 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binpr
if (p->fs->in_exec)
res = -EAGAIN;
p->fs->in_exec = 1;
+ res = 1;
}
-
- unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
write_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
return res;
@@ -1284,6 +1283,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
struct file *file;
struct files_struct *displaced;
+ bool clear_in_exec;
int retval;
retval = unshare_files(&displaced);
@@ -1306,8 +1306,9 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
goto out_unlock;
retval = check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
- if (retval)
+ if (retval < 0)
goto out_unlock;
+ clear_in_exec = retval;
file = open_exec(filename);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
@@ -1355,9 +1356,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
goto out;
/* execve succeeded */
- write_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
- write_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
current->in_execve = 0;
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
@@ -1377,9 +1376,8 @@ out_file:
}
out_unmark:
- write_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
- current->fs->in_exec = 0;
- write_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
+ if (clear_in_exec)
+ current->fs->in_exec = 0;
out_unlock:
current->in_execve = 0;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-04-06 15:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-03-28 23:16 [PATCH 1/4] compat_do_execve should unshare_files Hugh Dickins
2009-03-28 23:20 ` [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 0:53 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 4:10 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:14 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 5:55 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 6:01 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 21:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:20 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 23:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 0:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:08 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:13 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:40 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 12:31 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 14:32 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-03-31 6:16 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 0:28 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 2:38 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 3:03 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 11:25 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:31 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2009-04-19 16:30 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 16:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 17:15 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 17:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 19:39 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:01 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18 ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-23 23:31 ` Al Viro
2009-04-24 11:57 ` [PATCH 3/2] check_unsafe_exec: rcu_read_unlock Hugh Dickins
2009-04-24 14:34 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-24 4:20 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:02 ` [PATCH 2/2] check_unsafe_exec: s/lock_task_sighand/rcu_read_lock/ Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18 ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-24 4:29 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 11:18 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:51 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:44 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 23:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-31 6:19 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:21 ` [PATCH 3/4] fix setuid sometimes wouldn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 11:19 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-29 21:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:37 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:23 ` [PATCH 4/4] Annotate struct fs_struct's usage count restriction Hugh Dickins
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