From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1762664AbZEGT3N (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 May 2009 15:29:13 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751970AbZEGT2x (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 May 2009 15:28:53 -0400 Received: from waste.org ([66.93.16.53]:50979 "EHLO waste.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754163AbZEGT2v (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 May 2009 15:28:51 -0400 Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 14:24:32 -0500 From: Matt Mackall To: Ingo Molnar Cc: Linus Torvalds , "Eric W. Biederman" , Arjan van de Ven , Jake Edge , security@kernel.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List , James Morris , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris , Alan Cox , Roland McGrath , mingo@redhat.com, Andrew Morton , Greg KH , Dave Jones Subject: Re: [Security] [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes Message-ID: <20090507192432.GN31071@waste.org> References: <20090505195246.GC21973@elte.hu> <20090505202219.GL31071@waste.org> <20090506103034.GA25203@elte.hu> <20090506162543.GT31071@waste.org> <20090506175717.GY31071@waste.org> <20090507005016.GJ31071@waste.org> <20090507150231.GB2344@elte.hu> <20090507181434.GL31071@waste.org> <20090507184136.GB30659@elte.hu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20090507184136.GB30659@elte.hu> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.13 (2006-08-11) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, May 07, 2009 at 08:41:36PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > * Matt Mackall wrote: > > > > As i mentioned it in the previous mail, i'd _really_ like to > > > hear your thread model and attack vector description. Does this > > > overhead justify the threat? Your change will only result in > > > get_random_int() not being considered fast anymore. > > > > My threat model is that someone more clever and with a lot more > > expertise attacking systems than either you or me will be able to > > leverage the extreme weakness of this hash (O(1) attacks against > > the *full* version!) into an attack that incrementally exposes the > > hidden RNG state. I've asked a couple such people whether they > > think that's likely, and they've said yes. > > My question was whether the variant laced with the cycle counter > could be exposable. In my world, some machines don't have TSCs, so I think this is the wrong question to be asking. -- Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.