From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@gmail.com>, Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, markus@google.com
Subject: Re: [RFC 1/1] seccomp: Add bitmask of allowed system calls.
Date: Fri, 8 May 2009 11:20:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090508092039.GC3559@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090507230021.GC6472@nowhere>
* Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2009 at 03:34:58PM -0700, Adam Langley wrote:
> > > That assessment is incorrect, there's no difference between safety
> > > here really.
> > >
> > > LSM cannot magically inspect user-space memory either when multiple
> > > threads may access it. The point would be to define filters for
> > > system call _arguments_, which are inherently thread-local and safe.
> >
> > If I hook security_operations.socket_connect, I can validate the struct
> > sockaddr after the final copy_from_user. However, since the sockaddr lives in
> > userspace memory, if I try and validate it from ftrace SYSCALL_ENTER, I can't
> > know that it won't change before sys_connect reads it again.
> >
> > Because of that, there are system calls which an LSM hook can safely accept
> > that an ftrace hook cannot. However, as you point out, any arguments passed in
> > registers are inheriently safe and these may be sufficiently powerful.
> >
> > > There are two problems with the bitmap scheme, which i also
> > > suggested in a previous thread but then found it to be lacking:
> > >
> > > 1) enumeration: you define a bitmap. That will be problematic
> > > between compat and native 64-bit (both have different syscall
> > > vectors).
> >
> > I /think/ it works out, but I've been bitten before with subtle 32/64 bit
> > compat issues and accept that it's a bit ugly.
> >
> > > 2) flexibility. It's an on/off selection per syscall. With the
> > > filter we have on, off, or filtered. That's a _whole_ lot more
> > > flexible.
> >
> > Absolutely.
> >
> > Is there a git tree that I can pull this parsing code from?
> > (git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-2.6-trace.git
> > maybe?). I can patch in the seccomp-on-ftrace work and try building the
> > filtering on top of that. I'll see how it turns out anyway.
>
>
> Hi,
>
> The most uptodate one is:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip.git
> on the tracing/filters topic.
>
> See kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
tracing/filters may lag behind - i'd suggest to use the master
branch, that's the most stable stuff generally. Or tracing/core for
any Git based tree.
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-05-08 9:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-05-07 21:48 [RFC 1/1] seccomp: Add bitmask of allowed system calls Adam Langley
2009-05-07 22:14 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 22:34 ` Adam Langley
2009-05-07 23:00 ` Frederic Weisbecker
2009-05-08 5:32 ` Tom Zanussi
2009-05-08 9:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-08 11:12 ` Frederic Weisbecker
2009-05-08 9:20 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2009-05-08 2:37 ` James Morris
2009-05-08 9:44 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-15 19:56 ` Pavel Machek
2009-05-15 20:29 ` Adam Langley
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