All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
To: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xensource.com" <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>,
	Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] MSR related clean up
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2009 17:21:26 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <200906241721.27265.sheng@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <C667AA8C.E090%keir.fraser@eu.citrix.com>

On Wednesday 24 June 2009 17:03:56 Keir Fraser wrote:
> On 24/06/2009 09:50, "Sheng Yang" <sheng@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > On Thursday 18 June 2009 17:57:06 Sheng Yang wrote:
> >> rdmsr_safe() is used to access MSR unknown to Xen, and is not safe... I
> >> think it is legacy.
> >>
> >> Also let msr_write be parity with msr_read on MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE.
> >>
> >> CC: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
> >
> > Keir?
>
> Looks pretty dangerous to me. So I'm not sure. There are various MSRs that
> are detected via CPU family/model (which we pass through) which would then
> #GP on access. Also this doesn't change the AMD default. Overall, what we
> have now does seem to work so I'm reluctant to mess with it.
>
Hi Keir

What we suffered now is, there are some MSRs existed in CPU, but shouldn't be 
accessed by guest. And guest should expected a GP fault for accessing, but we 
return a real value, which is not desired at all.

And in general, reading from unknown native MSR is dangerous, and also break 
host/guest isolation. I think we at least should control what we read from 
native. Maybe add more MSR handling is necessary.

-- 
regards
Yang, Sheng

  reply	other threads:[~2009-06-24  9:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-06-18  9:57 [PATCH] MSR related clean up Sheng Yang
2009-06-24  8:50 ` Sheng Yang
2009-06-24  9:03   ` Keir Fraser
2009-06-24  9:21     ` Sheng Yang [this message]
2009-06-24  9:27       ` Keir Fraser
2009-06-24  9:45         ` Dong, Eddie
2009-06-24 10:48           ` Keir Fraser
2009-06-24 13:41             ` Dong, Eddie

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=200906241721.27265.sheng@linux.intel.com \
    --to=sheng@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=eddie.dong@intel.com \
    --cc=keir.fraser@eu.citrix.com \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xensource.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.