From: Tracy Reed <treed@ultraviolet.org>
To: SELinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Subject: Possible OpenSSH exploit
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2009 13:50:45 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090707205045.GR22434@tracyreed.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4A53A665.8020003@manicmethod.com>
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So far just rumors but this looks potentially scary:
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Jul/0028.html
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=6742
One of my biggest reasons for using SE Linux for so long has been the
hopeful mitigation of such exploits. If this is real and SE Linux
mitigates it this could be serious validation for the whole SE Linux
philosophy. If somehow we still get owned while running the latest SE
Linux confined ssh I will be very disappointed.
Hopefully it's just a false alarm.
--
Tracy Reed
http://tracyreed.org
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-07-07 20:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-06-08 19:07 libsemanage direct_api can return errors < 0 Daniel J Walsh
2009-07-07 19:47 ` Joshua Brindle
2009-07-07 20:50 ` Tracy Reed [this message]
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