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From: Greg KH <gregkh@suse.de>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, stable@kernel.org
Cc: lwn@lwn.net
Subject: Re: Linux 2.6.27.27
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2009 21:07:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090720040728.GB11940@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090720040655.GA11940@kroah.com>

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 90764ee..387a5fd 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 VERSION = 2
 PATCHLEVEL = 6
 SUBLEVEL = 27
-EXTRAVERSION = .26
+EXTRAVERSION = .27
 NAME = Trembling Tortoise
 
 # *DOCUMENTATION*
@@ -340,7 +340,8 @@ KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -D__KERNEL__ $(LINUXINCLUDE)
 
 KBUILD_CFLAGS   := -Wall -Wundef -Wstrict-prototypes -Wno-trigraphs \
 		   -fno-strict-aliasing -fno-common \
-		   -Werror-implicit-function-declaration
+		   -Werror-implicit-function-declaration \
+		   -fno-delete-null-pointer-checks
 KBUILD_AFLAGS   := -D__ASSEMBLY__
 
 # Read KERNELRELEASE from include/config/kernel.release (if it exists)
@@ -556,7 +557,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wdeclaration-after-statement,)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wno-pointer-sign,)
 
 # disable invalid "can't wrap" optimzations for signed / pointers
-KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-fwrapv)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-fno-strict-overflow)
 
 # Add user supplied CPPFLAGS, AFLAGS and CFLAGS as the last assignments
 # But warn user when we do so
diff --git a/drivers/block/floppy.c b/drivers/block/floppy.c
index 615fcd3..5900f76 100644
--- a/drivers/block/floppy.c
+++ b/drivers/block/floppy.c
@@ -3320,7 +3320,10 @@ static inline int set_geometry(unsigned int cmd, struct floppy_struct *g,
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
 		mutex_lock(&open_lock);
-		LOCK_FDC(drive, 1);
+		if (lock_fdc(drive, 1)) {
+			mutex_unlock(&open_lock);
+			return -EINTR;
+		}
 		floppy_type[type] = *g;
 		floppy_type[type].name = "user format";
 		for (cnt = type << 2; cnt < (type << 2) + 4; cnt++)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c
index 925efaf..ace998c 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm.c
@@ -265,10 +265,6 @@ static int dm_blk_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (test_bit(DMF_FREEING, &md->flags) ||
-	    test_bit(DMF_DELETING, &md->flags))
-		return NULL;
-
 	dm_get(md);
 	atomic_inc(&md->open_count);
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/tulip/interrupt.c b/drivers/net/tulip/interrupt.c
index c6bad98..7faf84f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tulip/interrupt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tulip/interrupt.c
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ int tulip_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
                /* If we own the next entry, it is a new packet. Send it up. */
                while ( ! (tp->rx_ring[entry].status & cpu_to_le32(DescOwned))) {
                        s32 status = le32_to_cpu(tp->rx_ring[entry].status);
+		       short pkt_len;
 
                        if (tp->dirty_rx + RX_RING_SIZE == tp->cur_rx)
                                break;
@@ -151,8 +152,28 @@ int tulip_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 		       if (++work_done >= budget)
                                goto not_done;
 
-                       if ((status & 0x38008300) != 0x0300) {
-                               if ((status & 0x38000300) != 0x0300) {
+		       /*
+			* Omit the four octet CRC from the length.
+			* (May not be considered valid until we have
+			* checked status for RxLengthOver2047 bits)
+			*/
+		       pkt_len = ((status >> 16) & 0x7ff) - 4;
+
+		       /*
+			* Maximum pkt_len is 1518 (1514 + vlan header)
+			* Anything higher than this is always invalid
+			* regardless of RxLengthOver2047 bits
+			*/
+
+		       if ((status & (RxLengthOver2047 |
+				      RxDescCRCError |
+				      RxDescCollisionSeen |
+				      RxDescRunt |
+				      RxDescDescErr |
+				      RxWholePkt)) != RxWholePkt
+			   || pkt_len > 1518) {
+			       if ((status & (RxLengthOver2047 |
+					      RxWholePkt)) != RxWholePkt) {
                                 /* Ingore earlier buffers. */
                                        if ((status & 0xffff) != 0x7fff) {
                                                if (tulip_debug > 1)
@@ -161,30 +182,23 @@ int tulip_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
                                                               dev->name, status);
                                                tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
                                        }
-                               } else if (status & RxDescFatalErr) {
+			       } else {
                                 /* There was a fatal error. */
                                        if (tulip_debug > 2)
                                                printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Receive error, Rx status %8.8x.\n",
                                                       dev->name, status);
                                        tp->stats.rx_errors++; /* end of a packet.*/
-                                       if (status & 0x0890) tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
+				       if (pkt_len > 1518 ||
+					   (status & RxDescRunt))
+					       tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
+
                                        if (status & 0x0004) tp->stats.rx_frame_errors++;
                                        if (status & 0x0002) tp->stats.rx_crc_errors++;
                                        if (status & 0x0001) tp->stats.rx_fifo_errors++;
                                }
                        } else {
-                               /* Omit the four octet CRC from the length. */
-                               short pkt_len = ((status >> 16) & 0x7ff) - 4;
                                struct sk_buff *skb;
 
-#ifndef final_version
-                               if (pkt_len > 1518) {
-                                       printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Bogus packet size of %d (%#x).\n",
-                                              dev->name, pkt_len, pkt_len);
-                                       pkt_len = 1518;
-                                       tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
-                               }
-#endif
                                /* Check if the packet is long enough to accept without copying
                                   to a minimally-sized skbuff. */
                                if (pkt_len < tulip_rx_copybreak
@@ -357,14 +371,35 @@ static int tulip_rx(struct net_device *dev)
 	/* If we own the next entry, it is a new packet. Send it up. */
 	while ( ! (tp->rx_ring[entry].status & cpu_to_le32(DescOwned))) {
 		s32 status = le32_to_cpu(tp->rx_ring[entry].status);
+		short pkt_len;
 
 		if (tulip_debug > 5)
 			printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: In tulip_rx(), entry %d %8.8x.\n",
 				   dev->name, entry, status);
 		if (--rx_work_limit < 0)
 			break;
-		if ((status & 0x38008300) != 0x0300) {
-			if ((status & 0x38000300) != 0x0300) {
+
+		/*
+		  Omit the four octet CRC from the length.
+		  (May not be considered valid until we have
+		  checked status for RxLengthOver2047 bits)
+		*/
+		pkt_len = ((status >> 16) & 0x7ff) - 4;
+		/*
+		  Maximum pkt_len is 1518 (1514 + vlan header)
+		  Anything higher than this is always invalid
+		  regardless of RxLengthOver2047 bits
+		*/
+
+		if ((status & (RxLengthOver2047 |
+			       RxDescCRCError |
+			       RxDescCollisionSeen |
+			       RxDescRunt |
+			       RxDescDescErr |
+			       RxWholePkt))        != RxWholePkt
+		     || pkt_len > 1518) {
+			if ((status & (RxLengthOver2047 |
+			     RxWholePkt))         != RxWholePkt) {
 				/* Ingore earlier buffers. */
 				if ((status & 0xffff) != 0x7fff) {
 					if (tulip_debug > 1)
@@ -373,31 +408,22 @@ static int tulip_rx(struct net_device *dev)
 							   dev->name, status);
 					tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
 				}
-			} else if (status & RxDescFatalErr) {
+			} else {
 				/* There was a fatal error. */
 				if (tulip_debug > 2)
 					printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Receive error, Rx status %8.8x.\n",
 						   dev->name, status);
 				tp->stats.rx_errors++; /* end of a packet.*/
-				if (status & 0x0890) tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
+				if (pkt_len > 1518 ||
+				    (status & RxDescRunt))
+					tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
 				if (status & 0x0004) tp->stats.rx_frame_errors++;
 				if (status & 0x0002) tp->stats.rx_crc_errors++;
 				if (status & 0x0001) tp->stats.rx_fifo_errors++;
 			}
 		} else {
-			/* Omit the four octet CRC from the length. */
-			short pkt_len = ((status >> 16) & 0x7ff) - 4;
 			struct sk_buff *skb;
 
-#ifndef final_version
-			if (pkt_len > 1518) {
-				printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Bogus packet size of %d (%#x).\n",
-					   dev->name, pkt_len, pkt_len);
-				pkt_len = 1518;
-				tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
-			}
-#endif
-
 			/* Check if the packet is long enough to accept without copying
 			   to a minimally-sized skbuff. */
 			if (pkt_len < tulip_rx_copybreak
diff --git a/drivers/net/tulip/tulip.h b/drivers/net/tulip/tulip.h
index 19abbc3..0afa2d4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tulip/tulip.h
+++ b/drivers/net/tulip/tulip.h
@@ -201,8 +201,38 @@ enum desc_status_bits {
 	DescStartPkt = 0x20000000,
 	DescEndRing  = 0x02000000,
 	DescUseLink  = 0x01000000,
-	RxDescFatalErr = 0x008000,
+
+	/*
+	 * Error summary flag is logical or of 'CRC Error', 'Collision Seen',
+	 * 'Frame Too Long', 'Runt' and 'Descriptor Error' flags generated
+	 * within tulip chip.
+	 */
+	RxDescErrorSummary = 0x8000,
+	RxDescCRCError = 0x0002,
+	RxDescCollisionSeen = 0x0040,
+
+	/*
+	 * 'Frame Too Long' flag is set if packet length including CRC exceeds
+	 * 1518.  However, a full sized VLAN tagged frame is 1522 bytes
+	 * including CRC.
+	 *
+	 * The tulip chip does not block oversized frames, and if this flag is
+	 * set on a receive descriptor it does not indicate the frame has been
+	 * truncated.  The receive descriptor also includes the actual length.
+	 * Therefore we can safety ignore this flag and check the length
+	 * ourselves.
+	 */
+	RxDescFrameTooLong = 0x0080,
+	RxDescRunt = 0x0800,
+	RxDescDescErr = 0x4000,
 	RxWholePkt   = 0x00000300,
+	/*
+	 * Top three bits of 14 bit frame length (status bits 27-29) should
+	 * never be set as that would make frame over 2047 bytes. The Receive
+	 * Watchdog flag (bit 4) may indicate the length is over 2048 and the
+	 * length field is invalid.
+	 */
+	RxLengthOver2047 = 0x38000010
 };
 
 
diff --git a/drivers/pci/iova.c b/drivers/pci/iova.c
index 3ef4ac0..078bf8b 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/iova.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/iova.c
@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2006, Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright © 2006-2009, Intel Corporation.
  *
- * This file is released under the GPLv2.
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
+ * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
+ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for
+ * more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
+ * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple
+ * Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Intel Corporation
  * Author: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
  */
 
@@ -123,7 +133,15 @@ move_left:
 	/* Insert the new_iova into domain rbtree by holding writer lock */
 	/* Add new node and rebalance tree. */
 	{
-		struct rb_node **entry = &((prev)), *parent = NULL;
+		struct rb_node **entry, *parent = NULL;
+
+		/* If we have 'prev', it's a valid place to start the
+		   insertion. Otherwise, start from the root. */
+		if (prev)
+			entry = &prev;
+		else
+			entry = &iovad->rbroot.rb_node;
+
 		/* Figure out where to put new node */
 		while (*entry) {
 			struct iova *this = container_of(*entry,
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index ae9775d..eeb7e56 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -572,12 +572,10 @@ static inline void set_page_links(struct page *page, enum zone_type zone,
  */
 static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	hint &= PAGE_MASK;
 	if (((void *)hint != NULL) &&
 	    (hint < mmap_min_addr))
 		return PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr);
-#endif
 	return hint;
 }
 
diff --git a/include/linux/personality.h b/include/linux/personality.h
index a84e9ff..1261208 100644
--- a/include/linux/personality.h
+++ b/include/linux/personality.h
@@ -40,7 +40,10 @@ enum {
  * Security-relevant compatibility flags that must be
  * cleared upon setuid or setgid exec:
  */
-#define PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID (READ_IMPLIES_EXEC|ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)
+#define PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID (READ_IMPLIES_EXEC  | \
+			    ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE  | \
+			    ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT | \
+			    MMAP_PAGE_ZERO)
 
 /*
  * Personality types.
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 80c4d00..1638afd 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2134,6 +2134,8 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 				     unsigned long addr,
 				     unsigned long addr_only)
 {
+	if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		return -EACCES;
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c
index 03d796c..87f675a 100644
--- a/kernel/resource.c
+++ b/kernel/resource.c
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static int __init reserve_setup(char *str)
 	static struct resource reserve[MAXRESERVE];
 
 	for (;;) {
-		int io_start, io_num;
+		unsigned int io_start, io_num;
 		int x = reserved;
 
 		if (get_option (&str, &io_start) != 2)
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 6816e6d..1228d65 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1132,7 +1132,6 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
 		.strategy	= &sysctl_jiffies,
 	},
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	{
 		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
 		.procname	= "mmap_min_addr",
@@ -1141,7 +1140,6 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= &proc_doulongvec_minmax,
 	},
-#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
 	{
 		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 0bd9c2d..07b4ec4 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -208,3 +208,21 @@ config VIRT_TO_BUS
 
 config MMU_NOTIFIER
 	bool
+
+config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+        int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
+        default 4096
+        help
+	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
+
+	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+	  Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
+	  permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
+	  this protection disabled.
+
+	  This value can be changed after boot using the
+	  /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 2ae093e..d330758 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ int sysctl_overcommit_ratio = 50;	/* default is 50% */
 int sysctl_max_map_count __read_mostly = DEFAULT_MAX_MAP_COUNT;
 atomic_long_t vm_committed_space = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);
 
+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */
+unsigned long mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
+
 /*
  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 5592939..38411dd 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -92,28 +92,8 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 
 	  See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
 	  more information about this module.
-	  
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
-        int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
-        depends on SECURITY
-        default 0
-        help
-	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
-	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
-	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
-
-	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
-	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
-	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
-	  Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
-	  permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
-	  this protection disabled.
-
-	  This value can be changed after boot using the
-	  /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
 
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3a4b4f5..27a315d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@ extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 struct security_operations *security_ops;	/* Initialized to NULL */
 
-/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */
-unsigned long mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
-
 static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	/* verify the security_operations structure exists */

  reply	other threads:[~2009-07-20  4:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-07-20  4:06 Linux 2.6.27.27 Greg KH
2009-07-20  4:07 ` Greg KH [this message]
2009-07-20 11:51 ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-20 15:10   ` Greg KH
2009-07-20 16:01     ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-20 21:45       ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-20 22:08         ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-20 23:47           ` Marc Dionne
2009-07-20 23:56             ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-21  0:37               ` Marc Dionne
2009-07-21  1:01                 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-21  6:40                   ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-21  1:05                 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-21  2:38                   ` Marc Dionne
2009-07-21  6:33           ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-21 10:16             ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-21 16:11               ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-21 19:15                 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-21 21:34                   ` Troy Moure
2009-07-22  0:53                     ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-22  1:07                       ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-22  6:16                         ` Troy Moure
2009-07-22 15:58                           ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-22  1:16                       ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-22  8:12                         ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-22  8:32                           ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-22  9:55                             ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-22 10:44                               ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-22  9:58                             ` Jens Rosenboom
2009-07-22 10:27                               ` Troy Moure
2009-07-22 10:54                               ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-22 10:24                             ` Troy Moure
2009-07-22 10:33                             ` Dick Streefland
2009-07-22 13:48                         ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-22 15:48                           ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-29 14:57                             ` Pavel Machek
2009-07-29 15:59                               ` Linus Torvalds
2009-07-22 11:49                       ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-22 13:27                         ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2009-07-22 13:45                         ` Krzysztof Oledzki
2009-07-22 15:36                         ` Ian Lance Taylor
2009-07-23 17:33     ` Krzysztof Olędzki
2009-07-24 21:13       ` Greg KH

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