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Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2009 12:38:50 +0200
From: Heinz Diehl <htd@fancy-poultry.org>
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Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Random fill
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On 31.08.2009, test532@codingninjas.org wrote: 

> I agree with Rick that one should use /dev/urandom (instead of encryption) due 
> to the enabling of known plaintext attacks

Known plaintext attacks on what? On a bunch of zeroes?

After overwriting the whole partition using dmcrypt via /dev/zero, the
random key used will be deleted irrevocably, and the partition gets a brand new
setup of LUKS/dmcrypt, and it gets partially filled with "real" data. You haven't
even to use the same algorithm, hash or whatever. How should this lead to
a significantly better situation to attack the key/ciphertext?