From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: Oren Laadan <orenl-eQaUEPhvms7ENvBUuze7eA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers-qjLDD68F18O7TbgM5vRIOg@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] add lsm name and lsm_info (policy header) to container info
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 09:43:15 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20091019144315.GA30535@us.ibm.com> (raw)
The LSM name is 'selinux', 'smack', 'tomoyo', or 'dummy'. We
add that to the container configuration section. We also add
a LSM policy configuration section. That is placed after the LSM
name. It is written by the LSM in security_checkpoint_header(),
called during checkpoint container(), and read by the LSM during
security_may_restart(), which is called from restore_lsm() in
restore_container().
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
---
Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt | 24 ++++++++++++++
checkpoint/checkpoint.c | 13 +++++++-
checkpoint/restart.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
checkpoint/sys.c | 21 ++++++++++++
include/linux/checkpoint.h | 7 +++-
include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h | 16 +++++++++
include/linux/checkpoint_types.h | 2 +
include/linux/security.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/capability.c | 24 ++++++++++++++
security/security.c | 26 +++++++++++++++
10 files changed, 230 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt b/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt
index 665f75b..40bdf8f 100644
--- a/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt
+++ b/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt
@@ -340,6 +340,30 @@ So that's why we don't want CAP_SYS_ADMIN required up-front. That way
we will be forced to more carefully review each of those features.
However, this can be controlled with a sysctl-variable.
+LSM
+===
+
+Security modules use custom labels on subjects and objects to
+further mediate access decisions beyond DAC controls. When
+checkpoint applications, these labels are [ work in progress ]
+checkpointed along with the objects. At restart, the
+RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag tells the kernel whether re-created objects
+whould keep their checkpointed labels, or get automatically
+recalculated labels. Since checkpointed labels will only make
+sense to the same LSM which was active at checkpoint time,
+sys_restart() with the RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag will fail with
+-EINVAL if the LSM active at restart is not the same as that
+active at checkpoint. If RESTART_KEEP_LSM is not specified,
+then objects will be given whatever default labels the LSM and
+their optional policy decide. Of course, when RESTART_KEEP_LSM
+is specified, the LSM may choose a different label than the
+checkpointed one, or fail the entire restart if the caller
+does not have permission to create objects with the checkpointed
+label.
+
+It should always be safe to take a checkpoint of an application
+under LSM_1, and restart it without the RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag
+under LSM_2.
Kernel interfaces
=================
diff --git a/checkpoint/checkpoint.c b/checkpoint/checkpoint.c
index 6eb8f3b..b8c323c 100644
--- a/checkpoint/checkpoint.c
+++ b/checkpoint/checkpoint.c
@@ -366,7 +366,18 @@ static int checkpoint_container(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, &h->h);
ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
- return ret;
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ memset(ctx->lsm_name, 0, CHECKPOINT_LSM_NAME_MAX + 1);
+ strlcpy(ctx->lsm_name, security_get_lsm_name(),
+ CHECKPOINT_LSM_NAME_MAX + 1);
+ ret = ckpt_write_buffer(ctx, ctx->lsm_name,
+ CHECKPOINT_LSM_NAME_MAX + 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return security_checkpoint_header(ctx);
}
/* write the checkpoint trailer */
diff --git a/checkpoint/restart.c b/checkpoint/restart.c
index 32a9fc5..0cd721c 100644
--- a/checkpoint/restart.c
+++ b/checkpoint/restart.c
@@ -624,6 +624,42 @@ static int restore_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
return ret;
}
+/* read the LSM configuration section */
+static int restore_lsm(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+ char *cur_lsm = security_get_lsm_name();
+
+ ret = _ckpt_read_buffer(ctx, ctx->lsm_name,
+ CHECKPOINT_LSM_NAME_MAX + 1);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ckpt_debug("Error %d reading lsm name\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM))
+ goto skip_lsm;
+
+ if (strncmp(cur_lsm, ctx->lsm_name, CHECKPOINT_LSM_NAME_MAX + 1) != 0) {
+ ckpt_debug("c/r: checkpointed LSM %s, current is %s.\n",
+ ctx->lsm_name, cur_lsm);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "lsm_none") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "default") != 0) {
+ ckpt_debug("c/r: RESTART_KEEP_LSM unsupported for %s\n",
+ ctx->lsm_name);
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ }
+
+skip_lsm:
+ ret = security_may_restart(ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ ckpt_debug("security_may_restart returned %d\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* read the container configuration section */
static int restore_container(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
{
@@ -635,6 +671,11 @@ static int restore_container(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
return PTR_ERR(h);
ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+ /* read the LSM name and info which follow ("are a part of")
+ * the ckpt_hdr_container */
+ ret = restore_lsm(ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ ckpt_debug("Error %d on LSM configuration\n", ret);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/checkpoint/sys.c b/checkpoint/sys.c
index 260a1ee..5b65eb0 100644
--- a/checkpoint/sys.c
+++ b/checkpoint/sys.c
@@ -169,6 +169,27 @@ void *ckpt_hdr_get_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int len, int type)
return h;
}
+#define DUMMY_LSM_INFO "dummy"
+
+int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return ckpt_write_obj_type(ctx, DUMMY_LSM_INFO,
+ strlen(DUMMY_LSM_INFO), CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ckpt_snarf_lsm_info
+ * If there is a CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO field, toss it.
+ * Used when the current LSM doesn't care about this field.
+ */
+void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct ckpt_hdr *h;
+
+ h = ckpt_read_buf_type(ctx, CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN, CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+ if (!IS_ERR(h))
+ ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+}
/*
* Helpers to manage c/r contexts: allocated for each checkpoint and/or
diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint.h b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
index dfcb59b..eedd5e7 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
* distribution for more details.
*/
-#define CHECKPOINT_VERSION 3
+#define CHECKPOINT_VERSION 4
/* checkpoint user flags */
#define CHECKPOINT_SUBTREE 0x1
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#define RESTART_TASKSELF 0x1
#define RESTART_FROZEN 0x2
#define RESTART_GHOST 0x4
+#define RESTART_KEEP_LSM 0x8
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
@@ -48,7 +49,9 @@
#define RESTART_USER_FLAGS \
(RESTART_TASKSELF | \
RESTART_FROZEN | \
+ RESTART_KEEP_LSM | \
RESTART_GHOST)
+#define CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN 200
extern int walk_task_subtree(struct task_struct *task,
int (*func)(struct task_struct *, void *),
@@ -62,6 +65,8 @@ extern void _ckpt_hdr_put(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *ptr, int n);
extern void ckpt_hdr_put(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *ptr);
extern void *ckpt_hdr_get(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int n);
extern void *ckpt_hdr_get_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int n, int type);
+extern int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+extern void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
extern int ckpt_write_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct ckpt_hdr *h);
extern int ckpt_write_obj_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
index ff2e4aa..636e189 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
@@ -27,6 +27,15 @@
#endif
/*
+ * /usr/include/linux/security.h is not exported to userspace, so
+ * we need this value here for userspace restart.c to read.
+ *
+ * CHECKPOINT_LSM_NAME_MAX should be SECURITY_NAME_MAX
+ * security_may_restart() has a BUILD_BUG_ON to enforce that.
+ */
+#define CHECKPOINT_LSM_NAME_MAX 10
+
+/*
* To maintain compatibility between 32-bit and 64-bit architecture flavors,
* keep data 64-bit aligned: use padding for structure members, and use
* __attribute__((aligned (8))) for the entire structure.
@@ -71,6 +80,8 @@ enum {
#define CKPT_HDR_STRING CKPT_HDR_STRING
CKPT_HDR_OBJREF,
#define CKPT_HDR_OBJREF CKPT_HDR_OBJREF
+ CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO,
+#define CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO
CKPT_HDR_TREE = 101,
#define CKPT_HDR_TREE CKPT_HDR_TREE
@@ -252,6 +263,11 @@ struct ckpt_const {
/* container configuration section header */
struct ckpt_hdr_container {
struct ckpt_hdr h;
+ /*
+ * the header is followed by the string:
+ * char lsm_name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]
+ * plus the CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO section
+ */
};
/* checkpoint image header */
diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h b/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h
index fa57cdc..b7d3053 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/ktime.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
struct ckpt_stats {
int uts_ns;
@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ struct ckpt_ctx {
struct task_struct *root_task; /* [container] root task */
struct nsproxy *root_nsproxy; /* [container] root nsproxy */
struct task_struct *root_freezer; /* [container] root task */
+ char lsm_name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]; /* security module at ckpt */
unsigned long kflags; /* kerenl flags */
unsigned long uflags; /* user flags */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1f16eea..99e4ebc 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -136,6 +136,13 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+struct ckpt_ctx;
+
+void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
struct security_mnt_opts {
@@ -1320,6 +1327,28 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @secdata contains the security context.
* @seclen contains the length of the security context.
*
+ * Security hooks for Checkpoint/restart
+ * (In addition to *_checkpoint and *_restore)
+ *
+ * @may_restart:
+ * Authorize sys_restart().
+ * Note that all construction of kernel resources, credentials,
+ * etc is already authorized per the caller's credentials. This
+ * hook is intended for the LSM to make further decisions about
+ * a task not being allowed to restart at all, for instance if
+ * the policy has changed since checkpoint.
+ * @ctx is the checkpoint/restart context (see <linux/checkpoint_types.h>)
+ * Return 0 if allowed, <0 on error.
+ *
+ * @checkpoint_header:
+ * Optionally write out a LSM-specific checkpoint header. This is
+ * a chance to write out policy information, for instance. The same
+ * LSM on restart can then use the info in security_may_restart() to
+ * refuse restart (for instance) across policy changes.
+ * The info is to be written as a an object of type CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO.
+ * @ctx is the checkpoint/restart context (see <linux/checkpoint_types.h>)
+ * Return 0 on success, <0 on error.
+ *
* Security hooks for Audit
*
* @audit_rule_init:
@@ -1556,6 +1585,11 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+ int (*may_restart) (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+ int (*checkpoint_header) (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1796,6 +1830,12 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+int security_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+int security_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
+
+char *security_get_lsm_name(void);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
struct security_mnt_opts {
};
@@ -1818,6 +1858,12 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
return 0;
}
+#define DEFAULT_LSM_NAME "lsm_none"
+static inline char *security_get_lsm_name(void)
+{
+ return DEFAULT_LSM_NAME;
+}
+
static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
@@ -2537,6 +2583,18 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+static inline int security_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int security_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 88f752e..23026e2 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -792,6 +792,26 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+static int cap_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note that all construction of kernel resources, credentials,
+ * etc is already authorized per the caller's credentials. This
+ * hook is intended for the LSM to make further decisions about
+ * a task not being allowed to restart at all, for instance if
+ * the policy has changed since checkpoint.
+ */
+ ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
@@ -992,6 +1012,10 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, may_restart);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, checkpoint_header);
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dc7674f..e4fa91a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+#include <linux/checkpoint.h>
+#endif
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
@@ -122,6 +125,11 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
return 0;
}
+char *security_get_lsm_name(void)
+{
+ return security_ops->name;
+}
+
/* Security operations */
int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
@@ -959,6 +967,24 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+int security_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ /*
+ * SECURITY_NAME_MAX is defined in linux/security.h,
+ * CHECKPOINT_LSM_NAME_MAX in linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CHECKPOINT_LSM_NAME_MAX != SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+
+ return security_ops->may_restart(ctx);
+}
+
+int security_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return security_ops->checkpoint_header(ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
--
1.6.1
next reply other threads:[~2009-10-19 14:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-10-19 14:43 Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
[not found] ` <20091019144315.GA30535-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-10-19 14:43 ` [PATCH 2/4] cr: add generic LSM c/r support (v6) Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20091019144341.GA30566-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-10-19 18:13 ` Oren Laadan
[not found] ` <4ADCAC5B.9080205-RdfvBDnrOixBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
2009-10-19 19:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20091019190227.GA7201-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-10-21 1:03 ` Oren Laadan
[not found] ` <4ADE5DEA.2000606-RdfvBDnrOixBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
2009-10-21 1:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20091021011846.GA26728-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-10-21 1:21 ` Oren Laadan
[not found] ` <4ADE621E.2080603-RdfvBDnrOixBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
2009-10-21 5:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-10-20 1:16 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-10-19 14:44 ` [PATCH user-cr] restart: accept the lsm_name field in header and add -k flag (v2) Serge E. Hallyn
2009-10-19 14:44 ` [PATCH 3/4] cr: add smack support to lsm c/r (v6) Serge E. Hallyn
2009-10-19 14:44 ` [PATCH 4/4] cr: add selinux support (v6) Serge E. Hallyn
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2009-11-11 15:58 [PATCH 0/4] Introduction: LSM c/r patchset serue-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA
[not found] ` <1257955132-8398-1-git-send-email-serue-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-11-11 15:58 ` [PATCH 1/4] add lsm name and lsm_info (policy header) to container info serue-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA
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