From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757282AbZLDUKw (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Dec 2009 15:10:52 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1757256AbZLDUKv (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Dec 2009 15:10:51 -0500 Received: from one.firstfloor.org ([213.235.205.2]:41943 "EHLO one.firstfloor.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757238AbZLDUKu (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Dec 2009 15:10:50 -0500 Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2009 21:10:56 +0100 From: Andi Kleen To: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Andi Kleen , "Cihula, Joseph" , Pavel Machek , "Wang, Shane" , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Ingo Molnar , "arjan@linux.intel.com" , "chrisw@sous-sol.org" , "jmorris@namei.org" , "jbeulich@novell.com" , "peterm@redhat.com" Subject: Re: [PATCH] intel_txt: add s3 userspace memory integrity verification Message-ID: <20091204201056.GB741@basil.fritz.box> References: <4A9CE0B2.5060608@intel.com> <4ABF2B50.6070106@intel.com> <20091004185801.GC1378@ucw.cz> <037F493892196B458CD3E193E8EBAD4F01F03277DF@pdsmsx502.ccr.corp.intel.com> <20091204081933.GE1540@ucw.cz> <4F65016F6CB04E49BFFA15D4F7B798D9AEDDD4C5@orsmsx506.amr.corp.intel.com> <20091204171333.GS18989@one.firstfloor.org> <4B194CA1.3070106@zytor.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <4B194CA1.3070106@zytor.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.17 (2007-11-01) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Dec 04, 2009 at 09:53:37AM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On 12/04/2009 09:13 AM, Andi Kleen wrote: > >>> > >>> So no, you did not audit do_suspend_lowlevel to make sure it does not > >>> follow function pointers. Bad. > >> > >> We aren't aware of any code or data used by the resume path that is outside of the tboot-MAC'ed regions above--if you can point out any then we will gladly address them. > > > > Code coverage is not enough, you need data coverage too. If someone > > modifies kernel data it's typically easy to subvert code as a next step. > > > > The only function pointers that are invoked on the do_suspend_lowlevel > path are some paravirt_crap pointers, but those are located inside > kernel static data. Was referring to panic(), like Pavel said. It would be relatively easy to subvert something called by panic that just jumps back to after the MAC checks. -Andi -- ak@linux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only.