From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
To: "Muntz, Daniel" <Dan.Muntz@netapp.com>
Cc: Michael Guntsche <mike-Z92qn3yYq0hWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>,
linux-nfs <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Problem with 2.6.33-rc1 and insecure flag
Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:46:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20091220154624.GC2841@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7A24DF798E223B4C9864E8F92E8C93EC04EBFD3F-hX7t0kiaRRpT+ZUat5FNkAK/GNPrWCqfQQ4Iyu8u01E@public.gmane.org>
On Sun, Dec 20, 2009 at 02:13:07AM -0800, Muntz, Daniel wrote:
> If one were to hit this bug with v4.x, would the error be something like
> this in the RPC layer:
>
> Reply State: denied (1)
> Reject State: AUTH_ERROR (1)
> Auth State: bad credential (seal broken) (1)
Since we let the "insecure" flag vary by filesystem, we don't catch this
until we decode filehandles, so return an nfs-level error.
--b.
>
> -Dan
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Michael Guntsche [mailto:mike-Z92qn3yYq0hWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org]
> > Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2009 1:46 AM
> > To: bfields@citi.umich.edu
> > Cc: linux-nfs
> > Subject: Re: Problem with 2.6.33-rc1 and insecure flag
> >
> > I think I figured out the problem.
> >
> > Apparently the code checked if insecure was set, while it
> > should check if it was NOT set.
> >
> > Kind regards,
> > Michael
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
> > index 1c12177..55c8e63 100644
> > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
> > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
> > @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static __be32
> > nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> > int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
> >
> > /* Check if the request originated from a secure port. */
> > - if (!rqstp->rq_secure && (flags & NFSEXP_INSECURE_PORT)) {
> > + if (!rqstp->rq_secure && !(flags & NFSEXP_INSECURE_PORT)) {
> > RPC_IFDEBUG(char buf[RPC_MAX_ADDRBUFLEN]);
> > dprintk(KERN_WARNING
> > "nfsd: request from insecure port %s!\n",
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
> > linux-nfs" in
> > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> >
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-12-20 15:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-12-20 9:46 Problem with 2.6.33-rc1 and insecure flag Michael Guntsche
[not found] ` <20091220094625.GA2159-8FIgwK2HfyKMj3X28ACnv+Tv7YV0F9Eg@public.gmane.org>
2009-12-20 10:13 ` Muntz, Daniel
[not found] ` <7A24DF798E223B4C9864E8F92E8C93EC04EBFD3F-hX7t0kiaRRpT+ZUat5FNkAK/GNPrWCqfQQ4Iyu8u01E@public.gmane.org>
2009-12-20 15:46 ` J. Bruce Fields [this message]
2009-12-20 15:41 ` J. Bruce Fields
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2009-12-20 9:28 Michael Guntsche
2009-12-20 1:52 Michael Guntsche
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