From: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fs: block cross-uid sticky symlinks
Date: Sun, 30 May 2010 21:23:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20100531042336.GS6056@outflux.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1275278063.20730.16.camel@localhost>
Hi Eric,
On Sun, May 30, 2010 at 11:54:23PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> We need to call this function in the SELinux case. So you'll need a
> patch like the one attached (not even compiled but I think it is right)
> [..]
> static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
> [..]
> + rc = cap_inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
Yeah, when I quickly checked SELinux and AppArmor, it seemed that they
were always calling down to all commoncaps functions, but it looks like
not in all cases. I think that Eric Biederman's observations here makes
the most sense: this check needs to happen without involving the LSMs
at all.
> > +int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
> > + struct nameidata *nameidata)
> > +{
> > + const struct inode *parent = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
> > + const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> > + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > +
> > + if (weak_sticky_symlinks)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + if ((parent->i_mode & (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH)) == (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH) &&
> > + parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid &&
> > + cred->fsuid != inode->i_uid) {
> > + printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "non-matching-uid symlink "
> > + "following attempted in sticky-directory by "
> > + "%s (fsuid %d)\n", current->comm, cred->fsuid);
> > + return -EACCES;
> > + }
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> What stops us from racing between the assignment of parent and it's
> first use with a rename on our object and rmdir on the old parent? I'm
> wondering if we need to be doing this test holding dentry->d_lock (which
> is what protects dentry->d_parent if I recall correctly)
>
> Certainly doesn't fix all of the raciness, but I think it would close
> the opps part. Maybe someone who knows the VFS better can tell me if I
> am misguided.
The only other use of d_parent I can see there is in may_delete(). With
vfs_unlink() calling that, it would seem to be racey too if we needed to
hold a lock for that. But it's not clear to me in vfs_follow_link is doing
locking somehow.
Thanks,
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-05-31 4:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-05-31 3:04 [PATCH v2] fs: block cross-uid sticky symlinks Kees Cook
2010-05-31 3:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-05-31 4:12 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 3:54 ` Eric Paris
2010-05-31 3:54 ` Eric Paris
2010-05-31 4:23 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2010-05-31 10:23 ` Alan Cox
2010-05-31 17:50 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 18:09 ` Alan Cox
2010-05-31 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 19:52 ` Al Viro
2010-05-31 22:00 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 19:27 ` Al Viro
2010-05-31 10:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2010-05-31 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 23:09 ` James Morris
2010-06-01 3:24 ` Kees Cook
2010-06-01 7:55 ` Christoph Hellwig
2010-06-01 11:55 ` Eric Paris
2010-06-01 14:52 ` Kees Cook
2010-06-01 15:34 ` Eric Paris
2010-06-01 17:31 ` tytso
2010-06-01 15:00 ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 10:47 ` tytso
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