From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753812Ab0J3PkM (ORCPT ); Sat, 30 Oct 2010 11:40:12 -0400 Received: from mail-ey0-f174.google.com ([209.85.215.174]:36499 "EHLO mail-ey0-f174.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751483Ab0J3PkI (ORCPT ); Sat, 30 Oct 2010 11:40:08 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-type:content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent; b=DFKunQzMuiLs+9cHvAwCyH8K7uWjYs5M6ND8l35vOp2Nvt0gdMPkJY8uNQsOV06xwz nKfgUPdWynWZ7jfITVCUfbdSLYijk9JxvGgvUBqntP+RHlP+RNeIDxkfXJs9XX5tJVzs PaFI6Jx3tuAGRr1zJTW6ih+ul1xmOlrAggI/4= Date: Sat, 30 Oct 2010 19:40:02 +0400 From: Vasiliy Kulikov To: Dan Rosenberg Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] ipc: shm: fix information leak to userland Message-ID: <20101030154002.GA14257@albatros> References: <1288450677.3964.1.camel@dan> <1288450814.3964.3.camel@dan> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1288450814.3964.3.camel@dan> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Dan, On Sat, Oct 30, 2010 at 11:00 -0400, Dan Rosenberg wrote: > This one already got taken care of by Kees Cook: > > http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/10/6/486 After 25 days it is still not in linux-next. Also the second hunk is IMO odd as all five fields are initialized: case IPC_OLD: { struct shminfo out; if(in->shmmax > INT_MAX) out.shmmax = INT_MAX; else out.shmmax = (int)in->shmmax; out.shmmin = in->shmmin; out.shmmni = in->shmmni; out.shmseg = in->shmseg; out.shmall = in->shmall; return copy_to_user(buf, &out, sizeof(out)); } /* Obsolete, used only for backwards compatibility */ struct shminfo { int shmmax; int shmmin; int shmmni; int shmseg; int shmall; }; And I see no padding hole in shminfo. > Thanks, > Dan > > > Structure shmid_ds is copied to userland with shm_unused{,2,3} > > fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack > > memory. > > Cc: stable@kernel.org > > Acked-by: Al Viro > > Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov > > --- > > Compile tested. > > ipc/shm.c | 1 + > > 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c > > index fd658a1..7d3bb22 100644 > > --- a/ipc/shm.c > > +++ b/ipc/shm.c > > @@ -479,6 +479,7 @@ static inline unsigned long copy_shmid_to_user(void __user *buf, struct shmid64_ > > { > > struct shmid_ds out; > > > > + memset(&out, 0, sizeof(out)); > > ipc64_perm_to_ipc_perm(&in->shm_perm, &out.shm_perm); > > out.shm_segsz = in->shm_segsz; > > out.shm_atime = in->shm_atime; > > Thanks, -- Vasiliy