From: Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Feitian PKI donation to dm-crypt projetc
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2010 17:40:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20101104164011.GA5819@tansi.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <slrnid5bdj.7rs.Mario.Holbe@darkside.dyn.samba-tng.org>
On Thu, Nov 04, 2010 at 01:57:23PM +0100, Mario 'BitKoenig' Holbe wrote:
> Heinz Diehl <htd@fancy-poultry.org> wrote:
> > On 04.11.2010, Arno Wagner wrote:
> >> Having a not completely encrypted initrd and kernel does
> > How would you boot such a system when initramfs / initrd is encrypted?
>
> Enable your boot-loader to decrypt it. Meanwhile, grub can do this.
One other option is trusted hardware, that can do the initial
decryption.
> This somewhat reduces but, of course, not eliminates the trust-problem:
> instead of having to trust your hardware, BIOS, boot-loader, kernel, and
> initramfs, you now have to trust your hardware, BIOS, and boot-loader
> only.
I completely agree. And with trusted hardware, you still have to
trust the hardware. However, there is some (limited) benefit,
namely the earlier in the boot process, the harder it gets for
an attacker, i.e. the more expensive.
Also, with good trusted hardware, remote attacks become infeasible
and you have to physically access the hardware. The same could be
done with booting from a write-protected memory stick or CD/DVD.
In all cases a class vulnerability remains, namely that everything
is open once the system runs. This is one reason, why encrypted
root is basically only worthwhile if the attacker _has_
physical access. But in that case a whole set of new attacks
become possible, that encryption does not help against, such
as hardware-keyloggers, patched BIOSes, changes to your read-only
boot-medium, etc..
I doubt that system encryption does help a lot in cases other
than when the complete system gets stolen (laptop). But then
normal system encryption for Windoes (e.g. TrueCrytp), and
data+tmp+var+swap encryption for Linux is quite enough.
Side note: Benefit of a chipcard in the scope of disk encryption
is that people that have trouble with passwords do not need to
remember them. I really don't see any other. This can be a valid
application, though.
Arno
--
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: 1E25338F FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C 0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
----
Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans
If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-11-04 16:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-11-03 18:26 [dm-crypt] Feitian PKI donation to dm-crypt projetc Jean-Michel Pouré - GOOZE
2010-11-03 20:29 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2010-11-03 22:34 ` Arno Wagner
2010-11-04 5:31 ` Jean-Michel Pouré - GOOZE
2010-11-05 13:48 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2010-11-05 14:21 ` Arno Wagner
2010-11-05 15:14 ` Viorel Tabara
2010-11-05 16:29 ` Ma Begaj
2010-11-06 18:16 ` Jean-Michel Pouré - GOOZE
2010-11-08 21:58 ` Mario 'BitKoenig' Holbe
2010-11-07 22:44 ` Arno Wagner
2010-11-04 8:45 ` Milan Broz
2010-11-04 12:16 ` Heinz Diehl
2010-11-04 12:57 ` Mario 'BitKoenig' Holbe
2010-11-04 16:40 ` Arno Wagner [this message]
2010-11-04 8:52 ` Milan Broz
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20101104164011.GA5819@tansi.org \
--to=arno@wagner.name \
--cc=dm-crypt@saout.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.