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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Security] proactive defense: using read-only memory
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2010 11:00:54 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20101117100053.GA1574@ucw.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20101107193520.GO5327@outflux.net>

Hi!

> - Modules need to be correctly marked RO/NX. This patch exists[3], but is
>   not in mainline. It needs to be in mainline.

Why not.

> - Pointers to function table also need to be marked read-only after
>   they are set. An example of this is the security_ops table pointer. It
>   gets set once at boot, and never changes again. These need to be handled
>   so it isn't possible to just trivially reaim the entire security_ops
>   table lookup somewhere else.

But there are too many of those. You can't block them all...

> - Entry points to set_kernel_text_rw() and similar need to be blockable.
>   Having these symbols available make kernel memory modification trivial;

What prevents attacker to just inlining those functions in the
exploit?

If you want protection domain inside kernel, perhaps you should take
ukernel approach?

-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

  parent reply	other threads:[~2010-11-17 10:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-11-07 19:35 [Security] proactive defense: using read-only memory Kees Cook
2010-11-08  6:13 ` [Security] proactive defense: using read-only memory, RO/NX modules Ingo Molnar
2010-11-08 10:03   ` Alan Cox
2010-11-08 21:42   ` Kees Cook
2010-11-10  9:04     ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-11  6:56       ` Kees Cook
2010-11-11  9:07         ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-13 19:59       ` matthieu castet
2010-11-14  9:56         ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-17 10:00 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2010-11-17 22:14   ` [Security] proactive defense: using read-only memory Kees Cook
2011-01-02  9:09     ` Pavel Machek
2010-11-18  0:12   ` Valdis.Kletnieks

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