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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	dhowells@redhat.com, oleg@mail.hallyn.com,
	dlezcano@mail.hallyn.com,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 09/10] userns: check user namespace for task->file uid equivalence checks
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2011 15:03:15 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110224150315.GI8262@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110224150150.GA8262@mail.hallyn.com>


Cheat for now and say all files belong to init_user_ns.  Next
step will be to let superblocks belong to a user_ns, and derive
inode_userns(inode) from inode->i_sb->s_user_ns.  Finally we'll
introduce more flexible arrangements.

Changelog:
	Feb 15: make is_owner_or_cap take const struct inode
	Feb 23: make is_owner_or_cap bool

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
---
 fs/inode.c         |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 fs/namei.c         |   20 +++++++++++++++-----
 include/linux/fs.h |    9 +++++++--
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index da85e56..f5ac235 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/async.h>
 #include <linux/posix_acl.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
 
 /*
  * This is needed for the following functions:
@@ -1722,3 +1723,19 @@ void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inode, const struct inode *dir,
 	inode->i_mode = mode;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
+
+/*
+ * return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the
+ * file, or owns the file.
+ */
+bool is_owner_or_cap(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns = inode_userns(inode);
+
+	if (current_user_ns() == ns && current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid)
+		return true;
+	if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_owner_or_cap);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 9e701e2..cfac5b4 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -176,6 +176,9 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flag
 
 	mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
 
+	if (current_user_ns() != inode_userns(inode))
+		goto other_perms;
+
 	if (current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid)
 		mode >>= 6;
 	else {
@@ -189,6 +192,7 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flag
 			mode >>= 3;
 	}
 
+other_perms:
 	/*
 	 * If the DACs are ok we don't need any capability check.
 	 */
@@ -230,7 +234,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flags,
 	 * Executable DACs are overridable if at least one exec bit is set.
 	 */
 	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
-		if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+		if (ns_capable(inode_userns(inode), CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 			return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -238,7 +242,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flags,
 	 */
 	mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
 	if (mask == MAY_READ || (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !(mask & MAY_WRITE)))
-		if (capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+		if (ns_capable(inode_userns(inode), CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 			return 0;
 
 	return -EACCES;
@@ -675,6 +679,7 @@ force_reval_path(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
 static inline int exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	int ret;
+	struct user_namespace *ns = inode_userns(inode);
 
 	if (inode->i_op->permission) {
 		ret = inode->i_op->permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, flags);
@@ -687,7 +692,7 @@ static inline int exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
 	if (ret == -ECHILD)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) || capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+	if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) || ns_capable(ns, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 		goto ok;
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1940,11 +1945,15 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
 
 	if (!(dir->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
 		return 0;
+	if (current_user_ns() != inode_userns(inode))
+		goto other_userns;
 	if (inode->i_uid == fsuid)
 		return 0;
 	if (dir->i_uid == fsuid)
 		return 0;
-	return !capable(CAP_FOWNER);
+
+other_userns:
+	return !ns_capable(inode_userns(inode), CAP_FOWNER);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2635,7 +2644,8 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && !capable(CAP_MKNOD))
+	if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) &&
+	    !ns_capable(inode_userns(dir), CAP_MKNOD))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (!dir->i_op->mknod)
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index bd32159..eb1ddde 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1446,8 +1446,13 @@ enum {
 #define put_fs_excl() atomic_dec(&current->fs_excl)
 #define has_fs_excl() atomic_read(&current->fs_excl)
 
-#define is_owner_or_cap(inode)	\
-	((current_fsuid() == (inode)->i_uid) || capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+/*
+ * until VFS tracks user namespaces for inodes, just make all files
+ * belong to init_user_ns
+ */
+extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
+#define inode_userns(inode) (&init_user_ns)
+extern bool is_owner_or_cap(const struct inode *inode);
 
 /* not quite ready to be deprecated, but... */
 extern void lock_super(struct super_block *);
-- 
1.7.0.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-02-24 15:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-02-24 15:01 [PATCH 01/10] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 02/10] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 03/10] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 04/10] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 05/10] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 16:57   ` David Howells
     [not found] ` <20110224150150.GA8262-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2011-02-24 15:02   ` [PATCH 02/10] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02   ` [PATCH 03/10] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02   ` [PATCH 04/10] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02   ` [PATCH 05/10] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02   ` [PATCH 06/10] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03   ` [PATCH 07/10] add a user namespace owner of ipc ns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03   ` [PATCH 08/10] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03   ` [PATCH 09/10] userns: check user namespace for task->file uid equivalence checks Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03   ` [PATCH 10/10] rename is_owner_or_cap to inode_owner_or_capable Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 17:03   ` [PATCH 01/10] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace David Howells
2011-03-01  0:28   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 06/10] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 07/10] add a user namespace owner of ipc ns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 08/10] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2011-03-01 22:24   ` [PATCH 09/10] userns: check user namespace for task->file uid equivalence checks Nathan Lynch
2011-03-01 23:07     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-03-01 23:07     ` Serge E. Hallyn
     [not found]   ` <20110224150315.GI8262-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2011-03-01 22:24     ` Nathan Lynch
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 10/10] rename is_owner_or_cap to inode_owner_or_capable Serge E. Hallyn
     [not found] ` <20110224150243.GE8262-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2011-02-24 16:57   ` [PATCH 05/10] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces David Howells
2011-02-24 17:03 ` [PATCH 01/10] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace David Howells
2011-03-01  0:28 ` Andrew Morton
     [not found]   ` <20110228162830.35a051a8.akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
2011-03-01  5:37     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-03-01  5:37   ` Serge E. Hallyn

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