From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/10] selinux: Fix handling of kernel generated packets on labeled IPsec
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2011 11:33:41 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110228103341.GE26510@secunet.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201102231645.58047.paul.moore@hp.com>
On Wed, Feb 23, 2011 at 04:45:57PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> >
> > Hm, I think we need to get this to work. Echo reply packets are just
> > one thing. Also other icmp messages can't be send. For example path mtu
> > discovery can't work with labeled IPsec. And have you tried to use
> > labeled IPsec on IPv6 networks? Kernel generated icmp messages are
> > quite important here.
>
> Yes, several years ago I worked on the IPsec stack for a commercial UNIX OS
> and we had to basically allow all IPv6/ICMP in the SPD so that router/neighbor
> discovery would work correctly. I believe that the specifications have now
> evolved to allow type/code which would make this a bit easier now.
>
> Why not just create a SPD rule that would send these ICMP packets over a
> traditional, unlabeled SA? Am I missing something that would require them to
> be sent over a labeled SA?
>
Might be possible. But I thought about this from a multi level security
point of view. Such packets should be send back over an SA with the same
confidential level as the receiving SA. Different confidential levels might
require different crypto algorithems etc.
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-02-28 10:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20110214131651.GA15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-14 16:59 ` [PATCHSET RFC] selinux: rework labeled IPsec networking Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110215121900.GA25769@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 0:02 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110221115403.GA20852@secunet.com>
2011-02-21 15:28 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110214131739.GB15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 19:18 ` [PATCH 01/10] selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110214131815.GC15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 19:34 ` [PATCH 02/10] selinux: Perform postroute access control checks after IPsec transfomations Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110222112334.GB20852@secunet.com>
2011-02-23 21:02 ` Paul Moore
2011-02-28 7:29 ` Steffen Klassert
[not found] ` <20110214131855.GD15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 19:39 ` [PATCH 03/10] selinux: Remove checks for xfrm transformations from selinux_xfrm_postroute_last Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110214131934.GE15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 19:46 ` [PATCH 04/10] selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110214132009.GF15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 20:11 ` [PATCH 05/10] selinux: selinux_xfrm_decode_session check for socket sid Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110222121143.GC20852@secunet.com>
2011-02-23 21:16 ` Paul Moore
2011-02-25 19:21 ` Joy Latten
2011-02-28 10:25 ` Steffen Klassert
2011-02-28 8:51 ` Steffen Klassert
[not found] ` <20110214132049.GG15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 20:19 ` [PATCH 06/10] selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110214132122.GH15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 20:32 ` [PATCH 07/10] selinux: Check receiving against sending interface on packet forwarding Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110222130409.GD20852@secunet.com>
2011-02-23 21:34 ` Paul Moore
2011-02-28 9:10 ` Steffen Klassert
[not found] ` <20110214132157.GI15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 20:57 ` [PATCH 08/10] selinux: Fix handling of kernel generated packets on labeled IPsec Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110222133150.GE20852@secunet.com>
2011-02-23 21:45 ` Paul Moore
2011-02-25 20:50 ` Joy Latten
2011-02-28 10:33 ` Steffen Klassert [this message]
2011-03-01 18:41 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110214132312.GK15640@secunet.com>
2011-02-16 21:08 ` [PATCH 10/10] selinux: Perform xfrm checks for unlabeled access in any case Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110222135217.GF20852@secunet.com>
2011-02-23 21:59 ` Paul Moore
2011-02-28 11:34 ` Steffen Klassert
2011-03-01 18:42 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20110214132234.GJ15640@secunet.com>
[not found] ` <1297889991.25079.46.camel@sifl>
2011-02-16 22:08 ` [PATCH 09/10] selinux: xfrm - notify users on dropped packets James Morris
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