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From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
To: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	H Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Asit K Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86, head_32/64.S: Enable SMEP
Date: Tue, 17 May 2011 03:10:06 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110517021006.GA6732@srcf.ucam.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1305581685-5144-4-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com>

On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 02:34:44PM -0700, Fenghua Yu wrote:
> From: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
> 
> Enable newly documented SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection) CPU
> feature in kernel.
> 
> SMEP prevents the CPU in kernel-mode to jump to an executable page that does
> not have the kernel/system flag set in the pte. This prevents the kernel
> from executing user-space code accidentally or maliciously, so it for example
> prevents kernel exploits from jumping to specially prepared user-mode shell
> code. The violation will cause page fault #PF and will have error code
> identical to XD violation.

Are EFI runtime service pages currently set up appropriately?

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org

  reply	other threads:[~2011-05-17  2:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-05-16 21:34 [PATCH v2 0/4] Enable SMEP CPU Feature Fenghua Yu
2011-05-16 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] x86, cpu: Add CPU flags for SMEP Fenghua Yu
2011-05-17  1:56   ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-05-16 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] x86, cpu: Add SMEP CPU feature in CR4 Fenghua Yu
2011-05-16 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] x86, head_32/64.S: Enable SMEP Fenghua Yu
2011-05-17  2:10   ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2011-05-17 23:08     ` Yu, Fenghua
2011-05-17 23:12       ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-05-18  2:57         ` Yu, Fenghua
2011-05-16 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] x86/kernel/common.c: Disable SMEP by kernel option nosmep Fenghua Yu
2011-05-16 22:01   ` Thomas Gleixner
2011-05-16 21:52 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] Enable SMEP CPU Feature H. Peter Anvin
2011-05-17  7:05   ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-17  9:15     ` Avi Kivity
2011-05-17  9:29       ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-17  9:32         ` Avi Kivity
2011-05-17 10:46           ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-17 11:34             ` Avi Kivity
2011-05-17 11:38               ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-17 11:44                 ` Avi Kivity
2011-05-17 11:47                   ` Avi Kivity
2011-05-17 11:49                     ` Pekka Enberg
2011-05-17 11:50                     ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-19  6:10               ` Tian, Kevin
2011-05-19  6:41                 ` Shan, Haitao
2011-05-20  8:21                   ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-17  7:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-05-17  9:16   ` Avi Kivity

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