From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754235Ab1EQLjs (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 May 2011 07:39:48 -0400 Received: from mx3.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.1.138]:40690 "EHLO mx3.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753713Ab1EQLjr (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 May 2011 07:39:47 -0400 Date: Tue, 17 May 2011 13:38:51 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar To: Avi Kivity Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" , Fenghua Yu , Thomas Gleixner , Asit K Mallick , Linus Torvalds , Arjan van de Ven , Andrew Morton , Andi Kleen , linux-kernel , Pekka Enberg Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] Enable SMEP CPU Feature Message-ID: <20110517113851.GD13475@elte.hu> References: <1305581685-5144-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com> <4DD19C81.8000902@zytor.com> <20110517070527.GD22305@elte.hu> <4DD23CB6.3050503@redhat.com> <20110517092903.GJ22093@elte.hu> <4DD2409F.4030800@redhat.com> <20110517104654.GN22093@elte.hu> <4DD25D29.9040008@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <4DD25D29.9040008@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-08-17) X-ELTE-SpamScore: -2.0 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-2.0 required=5.9 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.3.1 -2.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% [score: 0.0000] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org * Avi Kivity wrote: > On 05/17/2011 01:46 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote: > >> > >> We could support it as a non-default feature, but that reduces its utility. > > > >It would be a nice touch for tools/kvm/: we would use KVM_GET_SREGS and > >KVM_GET_SREGS to twiddle CR4.SMEP, even without the guest explicitly doing it. > > > >A quick glance suggests that it could be done straight away in > >tools/kvm/kvm-cpu.c::kvm_cpu__setup_sregs() during vcpu setup, and hopefully > >that cr4 value survives boot and ends up in the guest kernel's mmu_cr4_features > >mask shadow register. > > Depends if the guest uses a read-modify-write pattern or not. We could do it > transparently in kvm.ko, since the real cr4 need not corresponds to the guest > notion (for example, we often set cr0.wp or cr0.ts even though the guest > wants them clear). Oh, being transparent is a nice touch when it comes to security measures (catching attackers who think there's no SMEP and such) - but that would need KVM support and a new ioctl to configure it, right? Thanks, Ingo