From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>, <stable@kernel.org>,
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] tracing: Have enable system events use the subsystem_open routine
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 17:19:33 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110706212015.344830666@goodmis.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20110706211931.764277374@goodmis.org
[-- Attachment #1: 0002-tracing-Have-enable-system-events-use-the-subsystem_.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 3767 bytes --]
From: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
As the system name can be freed when a module is removed, the reference
to the system name that is passed to the enable routines to enable
events at a system level can point to arbitrary memory. This value is
only read, but it will just read garbage.
Change the system event enabling to use the subsystem_open routines
like the system filter routines do.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
---
kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
index ffc5b28..3e2a7c9 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ system_enable_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt,
loff_t *ppos)
{
const char set_to_char[4] = { '?', '0', '1', 'X' };
- const char *system = filp->private_data;
+ struct event_subsystem *system = filp->private_data;
struct ftrace_event_call *call;
char buf[2];
int set = 0;
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ system_enable_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt,
if (!call->name || !call->class || !call->class->reg)
continue;
- if (system && strcmp(call->class->system, system) != 0)
+ if (system && strcmp(call->class->system, system->name) != 0)
continue;
/*
@@ -598,7 +598,8 @@ static ssize_t
system_enable_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt,
loff_t *ppos)
{
- const char *system = filp->private_data;
+ struct event_subsystem *system = filp->private_data;
+ const char *name = NULL;
unsigned long val;
char buf[64];
ssize_t ret;
@@ -622,7 +623,14 @@ system_enable_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt,
if (val != 0 && val != 1)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = __ftrace_set_clr_event(NULL, system, NULL, val);
+ /*
+ * Opening of "enable" adds a ref count to system,
+ * so the name is safe to use.
+ */
+ if (system)
+ name = system->name;
+
+ ret = __ftrace_set_clr_event(NULL, name, NULL, val);
if (ret)
goto out;
@@ -862,6 +870,9 @@ static int subsystem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
struct event_subsystem *system = NULL;
int ret;
+ if (!inode->i_private)
+ goto skip_search;
+
/* Make sure the system still exists */
mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(system, &event_subsystems, list) {
@@ -880,8 +891,9 @@ static int subsystem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
if (system != inode->i_private)
return -ENODEV;
+ skip_search:
ret = tracing_open_generic(inode, filp);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0 && system)
put_system(system);
return ret;
@@ -891,7 +903,8 @@ static int subsystem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct event_subsystem *system = inode->i_private;
- put_system(system);
+ if (system)
+ put_system(system);
return 0;
}
@@ -1041,10 +1054,11 @@ static const struct file_operations ftrace_subsystem_filter_fops = {
};
static const struct file_operations ftrace_system_enable_fops = {
- .open = tracing_open_generic,
+ .open = subsystem_open,
.read = system_enable_read,
.write = system_enable_write,
.llseek = default_llseek,
+ .release = subsystem_release,
};
static const struct file_operations ftrace_show_header_fops = {
@@ -1133,8 +1147,7 @@ event_subsystem_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *d_events)
"'%s/filter' entry\n", name);
}
- trace_create_file("enable", 0644, system->entry,
- (void *)system->name,
+ trace_create_file("enable", 0644, system->entry, system,
&ftrace_system_enable_fops);
return system->entry;
--
1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-07-06 21:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-07-06 21:19 [PATCH 0/2] [GIT PULL][v3.0] tracing: Add refcount for system filter and enable Steven Rostedt
2011-07-06 21:19 ` [PATCH 1/2] tracing: Add ref_count to event systems for freeing Steven Rostedt
2011-07-06 21:19 ` Steven Rostedt [this message]
2011-07-07 14:15 ` [PATCH 0/2] [GIT PULL][v3.0] tracing: Add refcount for system filter and enable Ingo Molnar
2011-07-07 14:23 ` Steven Rostedt
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20110706212015.344830666@goodmis.org \
--to=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=fweisbec@gmail.com \
--cc=johannes.berg@intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@elte.hu \
--cc=stable@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.