From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754347Ab1JBTY5 (ORCPT ); Sun, 2 Oct 2011 15:24:57 -0400 Received: from 1wt.eu ([62.212.114.60]:33391 "EHLO 1wt.eu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754308Ab1JBTYx (ORCPT ); Sun, 2 Oct 2011 15:24:53 -0400 Date: Sun, 2 Oct 2011 21:24:49 +0200 From: Willy Tarreau To: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Greg KH Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust Message-ID: <20111002192449.GM18690@1wt.eu> References: <4E8655CD.90107@zytor.com> <201110021354.57995.rjw@sisk.pl> <4E88A537.4010008@zytor.com> <201110022014.27549.rjw@sisk.pl> <4E88AB2C.60804@zytor.com> <20111002183937.GL18690@1wt.eu> <4E88B549.4020008@zytor.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <4E88B549.4020008@zytor.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2.3i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sun, Oct 02, 2011 at 12:02:33PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On 10/02/2011 11:39 AM, Willy Tarreau wrote: > > > > I'm not opposed to generate a second key, but I don't really understand > > how it solves the isolation issue. I'm not used to key signing parties > > and am presently in the situation where I don't know whom to ping to > > sign my key. The only thing I could do was to sign it with my old key > > as you suggested in the initial mail on the subject :-/ > > > > So if at least generating a second key can save that hassle for next > > time, I'm all in favor of making it, it just takes a few seconds. > > > > The idea is that you have a key that you keep *extremely* secure. When > you go to key signing parties you only bring the public key (for > verifying the fingerprint) but you don't sign keys until you're at your > secure host, for example. > > That is the key you will use to establish yourself in the web of trust. > The key you will actually *use* is a child key signed with that key, > and perhaps a handful of others. > > That way, if your everyday key is compromised, you can still use your > secure key to sign the everyday key. This alone will get you "marginal" > trust in the PGP web, which is good enough to get you new credentials. OK that makes sense. Thanks for the explanation. Willy