From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Greg KH Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Staging: hv: Move the mouse driver out of staging Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2011 08:34:09 +0200 Message-ID: <20111029063409.GB2207@suse.de> References: <1319645321-9770-1-git-send-email-kys@microsoft.com> <6E21E5352C11B742B20C142EB499E0481AA531D4@TK5EX14MBXC122.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> <20111028200315.GA30918@suse.de> <6E21E5352C11B742B20C142EB499E0481AA53219@TK5EX14MBXC122.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <6E21E5352C11B742B20C142EB499E0481AA53219@TK5EX14MBXC122.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: devel-bounces@linuxdriverproject.org Sender: devel-bounces@linuxdriverproject.org To: KY Srinivasan Cc: Jiri Kosina , Dmitry Torokhov , "ohering@suse.com" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "virtualization@lists.osdl.org" , "devel@linuxdriverproject.org" List-Id: virtualization@lists.linuxfoundation.org On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 08:28:11PM +0000, KY Srinivasan wrote: > > > The guest cannot survive a malicious host; so I think it is safe to say that the > > > guest can assume the host is following the protocol. > > > > That's not good for a very large number of reasons, not the least being > > that we have no idea how secure the hyperv hypervisor is, so making it > > so that there isn't an obvious hole into linux through it, would be a > > good idea. > > > > And yes, I'd say the same thing if this was a KVM or Xen driver as well. > > Please be very defensive in this area of the code, especially as there > > are no performance issues here. > > In the chain of trust, the hypervisor and the host are the foundations > as far as the guest is concerned, since both the hypervisor and the host > can affect the guest in ways that the guest has no obvious way to protect itself. That's true. > If the hypervisor/host have security holes, there is not much you can do in the guest > to deal with it. > In this case, I can add checks but I am not sure how useful it is. I would prefer to see them here, just to be safe, it can not hurt, right? greg k-h From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752977Ab1J2GfO (ORCPT ); Sat, 29 Oct 2011 02:35:14 -0400 Received: from cantor2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:58382 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750749Ab1J2GfM (ORCPT ); Sat, 29 Oct 2011 02:35:12 -0400 Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2011 08:34:09 +0200 From: Greg KH To: KY Srinivasan Cc: Jiri Kosina , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "devel@linuxdriverproject.org" , "virtualization@lists.osdl.org" , "ohering@suse.com" , Dmitry Torokhov Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Staging: hv: Move the mouse driver out of staging Message-ID: <20111029063409.GB2207@suse.de> References: <1319645321-9770-1-git-send-email-kys@microsoft.com> <6E21E5352C11B742B20C142EB499E0481AA531D4@TK5EX14MBXC122.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> <20111028200315.GA30918@suse.de> <6E21E5352C11B742B20C142EB499E0481AA53219@TK5EX14MBXC122.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <6E21E5352C11B742B20C142EB499E0481AA53219@TK5EX14MBXC122.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 08:28:11PM +0000, KY Srinivasan wrote: > > > The guest cannot survive a malicious host; so I think it is safe to say that the > > > guest can assume the host is following the protocol. > > > > That's not good for a very large number of reasons, not the least being > > that we have no idea how secure the hyperv hypervisor is, so making it > > so that there isn't an obvious hole into linux through it, would be a > > good idea. > > > > And yes, I'd say the same thing if this was a KVM or Xen driver as well. > > Please be very defensive in this area of the code, especially as there > > are no performance issues here. > > In the chain of trust, the hypervisor and the host are the foundations > as far as the guest is concerned, since both the hypervisor and the host > can affect the guest in ways that the guest has no obvious way to protect itself. That's true. > If the hypervisor/host have security holes, there is not much you can do in the guest > to deal with it. > In this case, I can add checks but I am not sure how useful it is. I would prefer to see them here, just to be safe, it can not hurt, right? greg k-h