[PATCH 1/7] imap-send: avoid buffer overflow

[Jeff King <peff@peff.net>]

We format the password prompt in an 80-character static
buffer. It contains the remote host and username, so it's
unlikely to overflow (or be exploitable by a remote
attacker), but there's no reason not to be careful and use
a strbuf.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
---
Just something I noticed while doing the cleanup in the next patch.

 imap-send.c |    7 ++++---
 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/imap-send.c b/imap-send.c
index e1ad1a4..4c1e897 100644
--- a/imap-send.c
+++ b/imap-send.c
@@ -1209,9 +1209,10 @@ static int auth_cram_md5(struct imap_store *ctx, struct imap_cmd *cmd, const cha
 			goto bail;
 		}
 		if (!srvc->pass) {
-			char prompt[80];
-			sprintf(prompt, "Password (%s@%s): ", srvc->user, srvc->host);
-			arg = git_getpass(prompt);
+			struct strbuf prompt = STRBUF_INIT;
+			strbuf_addf(&prompt, "Password (%s@%s): ", srvc->user, srvc->host);
+			arg = git_getpass(prompt.buf);
+			strbuf_release(&prompt);
 			if (!arg) {
 				perror("getpass");
 				exit(1);
-- 
1.7.8.rc2.8.gf0f4f