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From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Subject: Re: [rfc] fcntl: Add F_GETOWNER_UIDS option
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2012 22:33:30 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120326183330.GM19395@moon> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120326164347.GA24394@redhat.com>

On Mon, Mar 26, 2012 at 06:43:47PM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 03/26, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > +static int f_getowner_uids(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
> > +{
> > +	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
> > +	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > +	uid_t * __user dst = (void * __user)arg;
> > +	uid_t src[2];
> > +	int err;
> > +
> > +	read_lock(&filp->f_owner.lock);
> > +	src[0] = filp->f_owner.uid;
> > +	src[1] = filp->f_owner.euid;
> > +	read_unlock(&filp->f_owner.lock);
> > +
> > +	src[0] = user_ns_map_uid(user_ns, cred, src[0]);
> > +	src[1] = user_ns_map_uid(user_ns, cred, src[1]);
> 
> Why?
> 
> In this case user_ns_map_uid() is "nop", it should always return
> the last arg, no?

Yes, but I wanted to be on safe side, and if one day user_ns_map_uid
get changed this function won't be security hole. Or I miss something
in general?

	Cyrill

  reply	other threads:[~2012-03-26 18:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-03-26 15:09 [rfc] fcntl: Add F_GETOWNER_UIDS option Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-26 16:43 ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-26 18:33   ` Cyrill Gorcunov [this message]
2012-03-27 15:25     ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-27 16:58       ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-27 22:29         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-03-27 22:34           ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-27 22:46             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-03-28  2:22               ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-03-28  6:48                 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
     [not found]                   ` <m1k425mae1.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org>
2012-03-28  7:55                     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-28  8:16                       ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-28 19:43                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-03-28 19:46                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-28 21:30                             ` Serge Hallyn
2012-03-28 21:32                               ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-28 21:37                               ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-29  2:30                                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-03-30 12:31                                   ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-30 14:12                                     ` Serge Hallyn
2012-03-30 14:40                                       ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2012-03-30 16:15                                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-03-30 19:46                                           ` Kees Cook
2012-03-30 19:56                                             ` Cyrill Gorcunov

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