From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>, Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>,
Andreas F??rber <afaerber@suse.de>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vnc: disable VNC password authentication (security type 2) when in FIPS mode
Date: Wed, 2 May 2012 12:05:06 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120502110506.GO13336@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120502102802.GA28788@lst.de>
On Wed, May 02, 2012 at 12:28:02PM +0200, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Wed, May 02, 2012 at 12:54:21AM +0200, Andreas F??rber wrote:
> > > + fds = fopen("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", "r");
> >
> > How standardized is this? Should we limit this to __linux__ or something?
>
> It's completelt non-standard and doesn't even exist in mainline Linux.
>
> All the FIPS bullshit is a RHEL-private feature, which is where this patch
> should stay as well.
You really should check your facts before making such grand assertions
that are trivially disprovable
It *is* in the mainline kernel:
$ wget https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/linux-3.3.4.tar.bz2
$ tar jxvf linux-3.3.4.tar.bz2
$ cd linux-3.3.4
$ find | grep -i fips
./crypto/fips.c
./include/linux/fips.h
$ find -type f | xargs grep fips_enabled
./drivers/char/random.c: if (fips_enabled) {
./crypto/fips.c:int fips_enabled;
./crypto/fips.c:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fips_enabled);
./crypto/fips.c: fips_enabled = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
./crypto/fips.c: fips_enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
./crypto/tcrypt.c: if (fips_enabled && ret == -EINVAL)
./crypto/tcrypt.c: if (!fips_enabled)
./crypto/testmgr.c: if (fips_enabled && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed)
./crypto/testmgr.c: if (fips_enabled && ((i >= 0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed) ||
./crypto/testmgr.c: if (fips_enabled && rc)
./crypto/testmgr.c: if (fips_enabled && !rc)
./crypto/proc.c: .procname = "fips_enabled",
./crypto/proc.c: .data = &fips_enabled,
./include/linux/fips.h:extern int fips_enabled;
./include/linux/fips.h:#define fips_enabled 0
It is *not* solely "RHEL bullshit":
$ cat /etc/fedora-release
Fedora release 17 (Beefy Miracle)
$ rpm -qf /lib64/libfipscheck.so.1
fipscheck-lib-1.3.0-3.fc17.x86_64
It *is* in all upstream crypto libraries:
# wget ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.5.0.tar.bz2
# tar jxvf libgcrypt-1.5.0.tar.bz2
# cd libgcrypt-1.5.0
# find | grep fips
./random/random-fips.c
./src/fips.c
./tests/fips186-dsa.c
./tests/fipsdrv.c
./doc/fips-fsm.pdf
./doc/fips-fsm.fig
./doc/fips-fsm.png
./doc/fips-fsm.eps
# wget http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.0.1b.tar.gz
# tar zxvf openssl-1.0.1b.tar.gz
# cd openssl-1.0.1b
# find | grep fips
./test/testfipsssl
./crypto/dsa/fips186a.txt
./crypto/o_fips.c
./crypto/evp/evp_fips.c
./crypto/fips_err.h
./crypto/fips_ers.c
# wget ftp://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/NSS_3_13_4_RTM/src/nss-3.13.4.tar.gz
# tar zxvf nss-3.13.4.tar.gz
# cd nss-3.13.4
# find | grep fips
./mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/fipsaudt.c
./mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
./mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
./mozilla/security/nss/tests/fips
./mozilla/security/nss/tests/fips/fips.sh
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/dsa.sh
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/rsa.sh
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/manifest.mn
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/rng.sh
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/fipstest.c
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/sha.sh
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/hmac.sh
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/tdea.sh
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/Makefile
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/ecdsa.sh
./mozilla/security/nss/cmd/fipstest/aes.sh
And fully documented by upstreams too
http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gcrypt/Enabling-FIPS-mode.html
https://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/fips/
http://www.openssl.org/docs/fips/fipsnotes.html
Regards,
Daniel
--
|: http://berrange.com -o- http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/ :|
|: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org :|
|: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|
|: http://entangle-photo.org -o- http://live.gnome.org/gtk-vnc :|
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-05-02 11:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-05-01 21:20 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] vnc: disable VNC password authentication (security type 2) when in FIPS mode Paul Moore
2012-05-01 22:54 ` Andreas Färber
2012-05-02 10:28 ` Christoph Hellwig
2012-05-02 11:05 ` Daniel P. Berrange [this message]
2012-05-02 15:45 ` Paul Moore
2012-05-01 23:26 ` Anthony Liguori
2012-05-01 23:43 ` George Wilson
2012-05-01 23:45 ` Anthony Liguori
2012-05-02 0:17 ` George Wilson
2012-05-02 9:29 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2012-05-02 9:16 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2012-05-02 9:18 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2012-05-02 15:50 ` Paul Moore
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20120502110506.GO13336@redhat.com \
--to=berrange@redhat.com \
--cc=afaerber@suse.de \
--cc=hch@lst.de \
--cc=pmoore@redhat.com \
--cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
--cc=sw@weilnetz.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.