Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] [PATCH 0/2] Sandboxing Qemu guests with Libseccomp

["Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>]

On Fri, May 04, 2012 at 04:08:36PM -0300, Eduardo Otubo wrote:
> Hello all,
> 
> This is the first effort to sandboxing Qemu guests using Libseccomp[0]. The
> patches that follows are pretty simple and straightforward. I added the correct
> options and checks to the configure script and the basic calls to libseccomp in
> the main loop at vl.c. Details of each one are in the emails of the patch set.
> 
> This support limits the system call footprint of the entire QEMU process to a
> limited set of syscalls, those that we know QEMU uses.  The idea is to limit
> the allowable syscalls, therefore limiting the impact that an attacked guest
> could have on the host system.

What functionality has been lost by applying this seccomp filter ? I've not
looked closely at the code, but it appears as if this blocks pretty much
any kind of runtime device changes. ie no hotplug of any kind will work ?

Daniel
-- 
|: http://berrange.com      -o-    http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/ :|
|: http://libvirt.org              -o-             http://virt-manager.org :|
|: http://autobuild.org       -o-         http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|
|: http://entangle-photo.org       -o-       http://live.gnome.org/gtk-vnc :|