From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Anton Arapov <anton@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] uprobes: uprobe_mmap/munmap needs list_for_each_entry_safe()
Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2012 18:46:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120713164632.GA23555@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120713164552.GA23509@redhat.com>
The bug was introduced by me in 449d0d7c "uprobes: Simplify the
usage of uprobe->pending_list".
Yes, we do not care about uprobe->pending_list after return and
nobody can remove the current list entry, but put_uprobe(uprobe)
can actually free it and thus we need list_for_each_safe().
Reported-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar.vnet.ibm.com>
---
kernel/events/uprobes.c | 8 ++++----
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
index 67697db..a93b6df 100644
--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ static void build_probe_list(struct inode *inode, struct list_head *head)
int uprobe_mmap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct list_head tmp_list;
- struct uprobe *uprobe;
+ struct uprobe *uprobe, *u;
struct inode *inode;
int ret, count;
@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ int uprobe_mmap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
ret = 0;
count = 0;
- list_for_each_entry(uprobe, &tmp_list, pending_list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(uprobe, u, &tmp_list, pending_list) {
if (!ret) {
loff_t vaddr = vma_address(vma, uprobe->offset);
@@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@ int uprobe_mmap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
void uprobe_munmap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
struct list_head tmp_list;
- struct uprobe *uprobe;
+ struct uprobe *uprobe, *u;
struct inode *inode;
if (!atomic_read(&uprobe_events) || !valid_vma(vma, false))
@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ void uprobe_munmap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned lon
mutex_lock(uprobes_mmap_hash(inode));
build_probe_list(inode, &tmp_list);
- list_for_each_entry(uprobe, &tmp_list, pending_list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(uprobe, u, &tmp_list, pending_list) {
loff_t vaddr = vma_address(vma, uprobe->offset);
if (vaddr >= start && vaddr < end) {
--
1.5.5.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-07-13 16:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-07-13 16:45 [PATCH 0/9] uprobes: misc, resend Oleg Nesterov
2012-07-13 16:46 ` [PATCH 1/9] uprobes: don't recheck vma/f_mapping in write_opcode() Oleg Nesterov
2012-07-13 16:46 ` [PATCH 2/9] uprobes: __replace_page() should not use page_address_in_vma() Oleg Nesterov
2012-07-13 16:46 ` [PATCH 3/9] uprobes: kill write_opcode()->lock_page(new_page) Oleg Nesterov
2012-07-13 16:46 ` [PATCH 4/9] uprobes: cleanup and document write_opcode()->lock_page(old_page) Oleg Nesterov
2012-07-13 16:46 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2012-07-13 16:46 ` [PATCH 6/9] uprobes: suppress uprobe_munmap() from mmput() Oleg Nesterov
2012-07-13 16:46 ` [PATCH 7/9] uprobes: fix overflow in vma_address/find_active_uprobe Oleg Nesterov
2012-07-13 16:46 ` [PATCH 8/9] uprobes: kill copy_vma()->uprobe_mmap() Oleg Nesterov
2012-07-13 16:46 ` [PATCH 9/9] uprobes: kill insert_vm_struct()->uprobe_mmap() Oleg Nesterov
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