All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Heinz Diehl <htd@fancy-poultry.org>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Memory Overwrite Request in cryptsetup
Date: Sat, 27 Oct 2012 12:48:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20121027104803.GB1497@fancy-poultry.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <508B6637.5020200@gmail.com>

On 27.10.2012, dave wrote: 

> Any plans to comply with TCG Platform Reset Attack Mitigation?

Why should this be neccessary? Unless you are a target for one of the
big agencies (which 99.99% of us certainly isn't, and which would raise
completely different problems than keys stored in memory for a few
seconds), it doesn't make sense to me.

To carry out this kind of attack, you need physical access to the
computer, and there's only a very small timeframe. How real is it that
people are just around the corner waiting to attack your machine? If
they would wait, they could actually do it now, while the machine is
turned on.

  reply	other threads:[~2012-10-27 10:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-10-27  4:42 [dm-crypt] Memory Overwrite Request in cryptsetup dave
2012-10-27 10:48 ` Heinz Diehl [this message]
2012-10-27 11:48   ` Arno Wagner

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20121027104803.GB1497@fancy-poultry.org \
    --to=htd@fancy-poultry.org \
    --cc=dm-crypt@saout.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.