From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Alan Cox Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 17:17:33 +0000 Message-ID: <20121031171733.0ff2a976@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> References: <1348152065-31353-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> <20121029174131.GC7580@srcf.ucam.org> <20121031155503.1aaf4c93@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121031170334.59833fb1@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <50915975.8030503@shealevy.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <50915975.8030503@shealevy.com> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Shea Levy Cc: Jiri Kosina , Josh Boyer , Matthew Garrett , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org > >> Prepare (as a root) a hand-crafted image, reboot, let the kernel resume > >> from that artificial image. > > It's not signed. It won't reboot from that image. > > So then to hibernate the kernel must have a signing key? No. If you break the kernel so you can patch swap we already lost. If you add a new bootable image and reboot your image won't boot anyway If you've got physical access you've already won So you can't break the swap image before hibernation. You can't boot something else to tamper with it and you've not got physical access.