From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 17:54:16 +0000 Message-ID: <20121102175416.GA11816@srcf.ucam.org> References: <1351762703.2391.31.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <1351763954.2391.37.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121101202701.GB20817@xo-6d-61-c0.localdomain> <5092E361.7080901@genband.com> <20121102163302.GA6080@elf.ucw.cz> <1351875164.2439.42.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121102165456.GB9997@srcf.ucam.org> <1351878511.2439.44.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1351878511.2439.44.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org To: James Bottomley Cc: Pavel Machek , Chris Friesen , Eric Paris , Jiri Kosina , Oliver Neukum , Alan Cox , Josh Boyer , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 05:48:31PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote: > On Fri, 2012-11-02 at 16:54 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 04:52:44PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote: > > > > > The first question is how many compromises do you need. Without > > > co-operation from windows, you don't get to install something in the > > > boot system, so if you're looking for a single compromise vector, the > > > only realistic attack is to trick the user into booting a hacked linux > > > system from USB or DVD. > > > > You run a binary. It pops up a box saying "Windows needs your permission > > to continue", just like almost every other Windows binary that's any > > use. Done. > > And if all the loaders do some type of present user test on a virgin > system, how do you propose to get that message up there? ? That's the message generated by the Windows access control mechanism when you run a binary that requests elevated privileges. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org