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From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
	dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov, xen-devel@lists.xensource.com,
	david.vrabel@citrix.com, stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: oopsable race in xen-gntdev (unsafe vma access)
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2012 15:18:24 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20121221201824.GA31554@phenom.dumpdata.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20121215181211.GV4939@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 06:12:11PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> 	1) find_vma() is *not* safe without ->mmap_sem and its result may
> very well be freed just as it's returned to caller.  IOW,
> gntdev_ioctl_get_offset_for_vaddr() is racy and may end up with
> dereferencing freed memory.
> 
> 	2) gntdev_vma_close() is putting NULL into map->vma with only
> ->mmap_sem held by caller.  Things like
>                 if (!map->vma)
>                         continue;
>                 if (map->vma->vm_start >= end)
>                         continue;
>                 if (map->vma->vm_end <= start)
> done with just priv->lock held are racy.
> 
> 	I'm not familiar with the code, but it looks like we need to
> protect gntdev_vma_close() guts with the same spinlock and probably
> hold ->mmap_sem shared around the "find_vma()+get to map->{index,count}"
> in the ioctl.  Or replace the logics in ioctl with search through the
> list of grant_map under the same spinlock...
> 
> 	Comments?
Hey Al,

Thank you for your analysis.

CC-ing Daniel, David and Stefano. I recall we had some priv->lock movement
in the past and there is also interaction with another piece of code - 
the balloon code so we better be circumspect of not blowing up.

Al, it is around holidays and folks are mostly gone - so this will take
a bit of time to get sorted out.

  reply	other threads:[~2012-12-21 20:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-12-15 18:12 oopsable race in xen-gntdev (unsafe vma access) Al Viro
2012-12-21 20:18 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [this message]
2013-01-02 22:57   ` oopsable race in xen-gntdev [PATCH 0/3] Daniel De Graaf
2013-01-02 22:57     ` [PATCH 1/3] xen/gntdev: fix unsafe vma access Daniel De Graaf
2013-01-02 22:57     ` [PATCH 2/3] xen/gntdev: correctly unmap unlinked maps in mmu notifier Daniel De Graaf
2013-01-02 22:57     ` [PATCH 3/3] xen/gntdev: remove erronous use of copy_to_user Daniel De Graaf
2013-01-11 17:40     ` oopsable race in xen-gntdev [PATCH 0/3] Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk

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