From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>,
Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: vfs: lockdep splat with prepare_bprm_creds
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2013 19:41:28 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130316194128.GC21522@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130315181956.GA9315@redhat.com>
On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 07:19:56PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 03/15, Al Viro wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 12:07:14AM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote:
> > > Hi all,
> > >
> > > While fuzzing with trinity inside a KVM tools guest running latest -next kernel
> > > I've stumbled on the following.
> > >
> > > Dave Jones reported something similar, but that seemed to involve cgroup's mutex
> > > and didn't seem like it was the same issue as this one.
> >
> > Lovely... It's an execve() attempt on a "binary" that is, in fact, a procfs
> > file (/proc/<pid>/stack),
> Cough... I am shy to disclose my ignorance, but could you explain how
> open_exec()->do_filp_open(MAY_EXEC) can succeed in this case? At least
> acl_permission_check() looks as if open_exec() should fail...
Umm... point. It might be a false positive, actually - some other
seq_file-based sucker (while chmod +x /proc/self/stack will fail,
chmod +x /proc/vmstat won't) that could be fed to execve(), leading to
1) kernel_read() from execve() can grab m.lock for *some* seq_file m,
while holding ->cred_guard_mutex
2) read() on /proc/self/stack tries to grab ->cred_guard_mutex,
while holding m.lock for a different seq_file m
... with lockdep having no idea that there's a reason why (1) and (2) can't
have the same seq_file involved, said reason being that all files with ->read()
trying to grab ->cred_guard_mutex don't have exec bit set *and* are impossible
to chmod.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-03-16 19:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-03-15 4:07 vfs: lockdep splat with prepare_bprm_creds Sasha Levin
2013-03-15 4:26 ` Al Viro
2013-03-15 18:19 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-03-16 19:41 ` Al Viro [this message]
2013-03-17 17:07 ` Oleg Nesterov
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