From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Subject: Re: [DRAFT] Coverity Access Policy Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 13:35:32 -0400 Message-ID: <20130924173532.GB14176@phenom.dumpdata.com> References: <1379945692.19256.160.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1379945692.19256.160.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org To: Ian Campbell Cc: Lars Kurth , xen-devel List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 03:14:52PM +0100, Ian Campbell wrote: > I've tried to codify some of the ideas put forward in the previous > thread and round out the proposal with some practicalities. > > I was undecided about requiring unanimity (i.e no objections from a > maintainer) rather than just consensus. Any thoughts on that? A (well > reasoned) objection should carry a fair bit of weight under these > circumstances I think. > > 8<-------------------------------- > > The Xen Project is registered with the "Coverity Scan" service[0] > which applies Coverity's static analyser to the Open Source > projects. The tool can and does find flaws in the source code which > can include security issues. > > Triaging and proposing solutions for the flaws found by Coverity is a > useful way in which Community members can contribute to the Xen > Project. However because the service may discover security issues and > the Xen Project practices responsible disclosure as described in "Xen > Security Problem Response Process"[1] the full database of issues > cannot simply be made public. > > Members of the community may request access to the Coverity database > under the condition that for any security issues discovered, they: > > * agree to follow the security response process[1]. > * undertake to report security issues discovered to the security team > (security@xen.org) within 3 days of discovery. > * waive their right to select the disclosure time line. Discoveries > will follow the default time lines given in the policy. > * agree to not disclose any issue discovered other than to the > security team, unless this has been approved by the security team. Perhaps that sentence above could be changed to: * agree to disclose issues discovered to the security team. Unless the security team has given approval to publicily disclose it. Otherwise: Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk > > Requests should be made to the public xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org > mailing list. The request must: > > * use a subject line prefixed "[COVERITY ACCESS] ". > * signal acceptance of the above conditions. > * include a short bio of the requester, covering who they are, what, > if any, their previous involvement with Xen has been (with > references to patches etc), their security background and if they > have not been previously involved with Xen why they are interested > specifically in the Xen project. > * be signed by a PGP key which is part of the strong set of the PGP > web of trust[2]. > > These last two items serve to help validate the identity and > trustworthiness of the person since they will be given access to > potentially sensitive information. > > Seven days will be given for responses. Following the "Consensus > Decision Making" process described in the project governance > document[3]. The request must be publicly seconded ('+1') by at least > one maintainer. Objections ('-1') may be raised but must contain a > rationale. > > [0] https://scan.coverity.com/faq > [1] http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html > [2] In practice this will be taken to mean that there is a path from a > member of the Xen.org security team's key to the key. Several > members of the security team have keys in the strong set. > [3] http://www.xenproject.org/governance.html > >