From: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
shemminger@networkplumber.org,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: seed random_int_secret at least poorly at core_initcall time
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 13:45:10 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131115184510.GA911@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+ySEdQBXKkspYC=svfekBja2Z_2tcWSAOEbvyiMLf=aA@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:33:04AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> Ingo wanted even more
> unpredictability, in the face of total failure from these more dynamic
> sources, so x86 also "seeds" itself with the build string and the
> boot_params. These last two are hardly high entropy, but they should
> at least make 2 different systems not have _identical_ entropy at the
> start. It's far from cryptographically secure, but it's something, I
> hope.
Those are both likely to be the same on some configurations.
On x86, we could maybe hash the dmi tables ? Vendor stupidity aside,
things like serial numbers in those tables _should_ be different.
Dave
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Jones <davej-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso-3s7WtUTddSA@public.gmane.org>,
Daniel Borkmann
<dborkman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>,
shemminger-OTpzqLSitTUnbdJkjeBofR2eb7JE58TQ@public.gmane.org,
Florian Weimer <fweimer-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Eric Dumazet
<eric.dumazet-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
linux-wireless-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: seed random_int_secret at least poorly at core_initcall time
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 13:45:10 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131115184510.GA911@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+ySEdQBXKkspYC=svfekBja2Z_2tcWSAOEbvyiMLf=aA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:33:04AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> Ingo wanted even more
> unpredictability, in the face of total failure from these more dynamic
> sources, so x86 also "seeds" itself with the build string and the
> boot_params. These last two are hardly high entropy, but they should
> at least make 2 different systems not have _identical_ entropy at the
> start. It's far from cryptographically secure, but it's something, I
> hope.
Those are both likely to be the same on some configurations.
On x86, we could maybe hash the dmi tables ? Vendor stupidity aside,
things like serial numbers in those tables _should_ be different.
Dave
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-11-15 18:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-11-11 11:20 [PATCH net-next 0/6] prandom fixes/improvements Daniel Borkmann
2013-11-11 11:20 ` [PATCH net-next 1/6] random32: fix off-by-one in seeding requirement Daniel Borkmann
2013-11-11 11:20 ` [PATCH net-next 2/6] random32: add periodic reseeding Daniel Borkmann
2013-11-11 11:20 ` [PATCH net-next 3/6] random32: add prandom_reseed_late() and call when nonblocking pool becomes initialized Daniel Borkmann
2013-11-11 13:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-11-12 0:03 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-12 0:37 ` Karl Beldan
2013-11-12 0:37 ` Karl Beldan
2013-11-12 8:36 ` Johannes Berg
2013-11-12 8:36 ` Johannes Berg
2013-11-12 11:13 ` Karl Beldan
2013-11-12 11:13 ` Karl Beldan
2013-11-12 13:09 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-12 11:53 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-11-12 12:04 ` Johannes Berg
2013-11-12 13:16 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-12 13:16 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-12 13:46 ` [PATCH] random: seed random_int_secret at least poorly at core_initcall time Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-12 13:46 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-14 2:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-11-14 2:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-11-14 4:18 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-14 5:05 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-14 5:05 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-15 18:42 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-16 7:40 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-16 7:40 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-15 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-15 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-15 18:45 ` Dave Jones [this message]
2013-11-15 18:45 ` Dave Jones
2013-11-15 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-15 21:05 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-11-15 21:05 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-11-11 11:20 ` [PATCH net-next 4/6] random32: move rnd_state to linux/random.h Daniel Borkmann
2013-11-11 11:20 ` [PATCH net-next 5/6] random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paper Daniel Borkmann
2013-11-11 11:20 ` [PATCH net-next 6/6] random32: add test cases for taus113 implementation Daniel Borkmann
2013-11-11 19:33 ` [PATCH net-next 0/6] prandom fixes/improvements David Miller
2013-11-11 19:44 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-11 20:00 ` David Miller
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