From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.saout.de ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.saout.de [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id aWQiWnPNlZqb for ; Wed, 11 Dec 2013 22:48:18 +0100 (CET) Received: from moutng.kundenserver.de (moutng.kundenserver.de [212.227.17.9]) (using TLSv1 with cipher RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.saout.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS for ; Wed, 11 Dec 2013 22:48:18 +0100 (CET) Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2013 22:48:16 +0100 From: Heinz Diehl Message-ID: <20131211214816.GA9509@fancy-poultry.org> References: <52A8B602.4030303@riseup.net> <20131211191607.GA9082@fancy-poultry.org> <20131211191816.GB9082@fancy-poultry.org> <20131211202151.GA15640@tansi.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20131211202151.GA15640@tansi.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Possibility for safe Luks partition delete functionality List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de On 11.12.2013, Arno Wagner wrote:=20 > Wit things like rubber-hise cryptoanalysis, you can still get > at it. If the header is wiped, that becomes impossible. Of course. You will then have the possibility to maybe safe your life by giving the passphrase to the adversary, which would be impossible if the header has been wiped. In all other situations, simply cutting the power will be the fastest way to secure your data in case of an "emergency". It all boils down to the fact that WDE is very suitable to protect your data in case a laptop gets stolen or a harddisk dies, but not against criminal minds putting a threat on your life. Furthermore, with solid state drives taking over the market, WDE renders all of their advantages (high speed and low access time) to zero. Just my 5=F8.